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Formalizing and Simulating the Token Aspects of Blockchain-Based Research Collaboration Platform Using Game Theory

Author

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  • Chibuzor Udokwu

    (Austrian Blockchain Center, 4 Perspektivstrasse, 1020 Vienna, Austria)

Abstract

Small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) need a platform that actively enables collaboration with research institutions and consultants as SMEs lack the financial resources to conduct independent research. Such a platform will require a verifiable manipulation-free system to enable, execute, and record collaboration activities and to track reputations among the organizations and individuals that use the platform. Blockchain provides an opportunity to build such a collaborative platform by enabling the verifiable recording of the results of the collaborations, aggregating the resulting reputation of the collaborating parties, and offering tokenized incentives to reward positive contributions to the platform. Cryptocurrencies from which blockchain tokens are derived are volatile, thereby reducing business organizations’ interest in blockchain applications. Hence, there is a need to design a self-sustaining valuable token model that incentivizes user behaviours that positively contribute to the platform. This paper explores the application of game theory in analyzing token-based economic interactions between various groups of users in an implemented blockchain-based collaboration platform to design and simulate a token distribution system that provides a fair reward mechanism for users while also providing a dynamic pricing model for the utility value provided by platform tokens. To achieve this objective, we adopted the design science research method, a running case of a blockchain collaboration platform that enables research collaboration, and extensive form games in game theory, first to analyze and simulate token outcomes of users of the collaboration platform. Secondly, the research used a logarithmic model to show the dynamic utility pricing property of the developed token model where the self-sustainability of the token is backed by the availability of an internal resource within the platform. Thirdly, we applied a qualitative approach to analyze potential risks in the designed token model and proposed risk mitigation strategies. Thus, the resulting models and their simulations, such as token distribution models and a dynamic token utility model, as well as the identified token risks and their mitigation strategies, represent the main contributions of this work.

Suggested Citation

  • Chibuzor Udokwu, 2024. "Formalizing and Simulating the Token Aspects of Blockchain-Based Research Collaboration Platform Using Game Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-19, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:20:p:3252-:d:1500706
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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