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Catch-22 And King-Of-The-Mountain Games

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  • Steven J. Brams
  • Christopher B. Jones

Abstract

In his classic novel, Catch-22 (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in World War II. This is generalized to a `generic' 2 × 2 strict ordinal game, which subsumes 12 specific catch-22 games . These games, along with 4 king-of-the-mountain games , turn out to be the only games in which moving power is effective , based on the `theory of moves': each player can induce a better outcome when it possesses this power than when its opponent possesses it. These 16 games constitute 28% of the 57 2 × 2 conflict games , in which there is no mutually best outcome. A specific catch-22 game is used to model the conflict between the pilot and the doctor who can certify his sanity in the Heller novel; a different catch-22 game is used to model medieval witch trials. King-of-the-mountain games portray related situations in which there is a contest to come out on top, but the player who `loses' does not suffer as much as in a catch-22 game. In all these games, cycling is always possible and frequently observed, despite the presence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in 10 of the 16 games.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & Christopher B. Jones, 1999. "Catch-22 And King-Of-The-Mountain Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 139-167, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:139-167
    DOI: 10.1177/104346399011002002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March.
    2. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
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    5. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2011. "Referenda as a Catch-22," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 121-138, June.
    2. Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "Mixed Strategies In The Mugging Game," Rationality and Society, , vol. 13(2), pages 205-212, May.
    3. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa & Baer-Nawrocka, Agnieszka, 2019. "Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU: Expected results and their social acceptance," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 607-622.
    4. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa, 2016. "Negotiation analysis using the theory of moves—Theoretical background and a case study," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 44-53.
    5. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.

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