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Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets

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  • Victor Domansky

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  • Victor Domansky, 2007. "Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 241-257, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:241-257
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0071-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
    2. Alexandre Marino & Bernard De Meyer, 2005. "Continuous versus Discrete Market Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1535, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haibei Chen & Xianglian Zhao, 2023. "Use intention of green financial security intelligence service based on UTAUT," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 25(10), pages 10709-10742, October.
    2. Marina Sandomirskaia, 2017. "Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(01), pages 1-7, March.
    3. Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2018. "On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 180-198, March.
    4. De Meyer, Bernard, 2010. "Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 42-71, May.
    5. Domansky, V. & Kreps, V., 2011. "Game Theoretic Bidding Model: Strategic Aspects of Price Formation at Stock Markets," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 11, pages 39-62.
    6. Chibuzor Udokwu, 2024. "Formalizing and Simulating the Token Aspects of Blockchain-Based Research Collaboration Platform Using Game Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-19, October.
    7. Victor Domansky & Victoria Kreps, 2012. "Game-theoretic model of financial markets with two risky assets," HSE Working papers WP BRP 16/EC/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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