Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0137-8
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More about this item
Keywords
Costly state verification; Financing contracts; Incentive compatibility; Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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