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Study of Flexibility Transformation in Thermal Power Enterprises under Multi-Factor Drivers: Application of Complex-Network Evolutionary Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Lefeng Cheng

    (School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

  • Pan Peng

    (School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

  • Wentian Lu

    (School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

  • Pengrong Huang

    (School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

  • Yang Chen

    (School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

Abstract

With the increasing share of renewable energy in the grid and the enhanced flexibility of the future power system, it is imperative for thermal power companies to explore alternative strategies. The flexible transformation of thermal power units is an effective strategy to address the previously mentioned challenges; however, the factors influencing the diffusion of this technology merit further investigation, yet they have been seldom examined by scholars. To address this gap, this issue is examined using an evolutionary game model of multi-agent complex networks, and a more realistic group structure is established through heterogeneous group differentiation. With factors such as group relationships, diffusion paths, compensation electricity prices, and subsidy intensities as variables, several diffusion scenarios are developed for research purposes. The results indicate that when upper-level enterprises influence the decision-making of lower-level enterprises, technology diffusion is significantly accelerated, and enhanced communication among thermal power enterprises further promotes diffusion. Among thermal power enterprises, leveraging large and medium-sized enterprises to promote the flexibility transformation of units proves to be an effective strategy. With regard to factors like the compensation price for depth peak shaving, the initial application ratio of groups, and the intensity of government subsidies, the compensation price emerges as the key factor. Only with a high compensation price can the other two factors effectively contribute to promoting technology diffusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Lefeng Cheng & Pan Peng & Wentian Lu & Pengrong Huang & Yang Chen, 2024. "Study of Flexibility Transformation in Thermal Power Enterprises under Multi-Factor Drivers: Application of Complex-Network Evolutionary Game Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(16), pages 1-23, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:16:p:2537-:d:1458036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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