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Collaborative Digital Governance for Sustainable Rural Development in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Shuangming Yin

    (School of Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China)

  • Yansong Li

    (School of Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China)

  • Xiaojuan Chen

    (School of Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China)

  • Woraphon Yamaka

    (Faculty of Economics, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai 50200, Thailand)

  • Jianxu Liu

    (School of Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China
    Faculty of Economics, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai 50200, Thailand)

Abstract

This paper explores the significance of digital governance for sustainable rural development in China, emphasizing the collaborative efforts of village administrative organizations, new agricultural business entities, and peasant households. Utilizing an evolutionary game approach, we examine the decision-making behaviors and stability points of these three entities within the context of rural digital governance. Our analysis is grounded in a mechanism of interest linkage among the stakeholders, with numerical simulations used to assess the impact of key variables and parameters on their evolutionary outcomes. The paper reveals that village administrative organizations are highly sensitive to changes in performance gains, special subsidies, penalty losses, and benefit distribution coefficients. Enhancing these variables can significantly motivate these organizations to engage in digital governance. In contrast, new agricultural business entities and peasant households demonstrate a stronger and more consistent willingness to collaborate, minimally affected by variable changes, which suggests a solid economic and social foundation for rural digital governance in China. Our paper underscores the need for positive incentives and a robust fault-tolerance mechanism to foster collaboration among village administrative organizations. It also highlights the importance of integrating new agricultural business entities into the digital governance framework to promote sustainable rural development. These insights provide valuable theoretical and practical implications for policymakers aiming to enhance the efficacy and inclusivity of digital governance in rural China.

Suggested Citation

  • Shuangming Yin & Yansong Li & Xiaojuan Chen & Woraphon Yamaka & Jianxu Liu, 2024. "Collaborative Digital Governance for Sustainable Rural Development in China: An Evolutionary Game Approach," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-23, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jagris:v:14:y:2024:i:9:p:1535-:d:1472284
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, April.
    4. Sun, Yang & Tang, Xinwei, 2022. "The impact of digital inclusive finance on sustainable economic growth in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    5. Gong, Maogang & Zhong, Yanan & Zhang, Yun & Elahi, Ehsan & Yang, Yuanxi, 2023. "Have the new round of agricultural land system reform improved farmers' agricultural inputs in China?," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
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