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Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Lina Mallozzi

    (Department of Mathematics and Applications, University of Naples Federico II, Via Claudio 21, 80125 Naples, Italy
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Roberta Messalli

    (Department of Economic and Statistic Science, University of Naples Federico II, Complesso Monte Sant’Angelo 21, 80125 Naples, Italy
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

Abstract

We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic resulting game. Some examples are illustrated.

Suggested Citation

  • Lina Mallozzi & Roberta Messalli, 2017. "Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-14, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:3:p:25-:d:102325
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi & Roberta Messalli, 2021. "Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games," Papers 2109.08471, arXiv.org.
    2. Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi & Roberta Messalli, 2023. "Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 566-588, June.

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