IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v127y2015icp27-30.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information

Author

Listed:
  • Nakamura, Tomoya

Abstract

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower’s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.

Suggested Citation

  • Nakamura, Tomoya, 2015. "One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 27-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:27-30
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514004716
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ui, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志 & Yoshizawa, Yasunori & 吉沢, 裕典, 2013. "Characterizing Social Value of Information," Discussion Papers 2013-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    3. Shinkai, Tetsuya, 2000. "Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 293-304, February.
    4. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, July.
    5. Esther Gal-Or, 1987. "First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(2), pages 279-292.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daher, Wassim & Karam, Fida & Ahmed, Naveed, 2023. "Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game," MPRA Paper 118138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Eray Cumbul, 2022. "Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 441-479, August.
    3. Lina Mallozzi & Roberta Messalli, 2017. "Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-14, June.
    4. Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    5. Wassim Daher & Fida Karam & Naveed Ahmed, 2023. "Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-16, November.
    6. Yuki Amemiya & Akifumi Ishihara & Tomoya Nakamura, 2021. "Pre‐emptive production and market competitiveness in oligopoly with private information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 449-455, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:dpr:wpaper:0908 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Tomoya Nakamura, 2014. "One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information," ISER Discussion Paper 0908r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2014.
    4. Yuki Amemiya & Akifumi Ishihara & Tomoya Nakamura, 2021. "Pre‐emptive production and market competitiveness in oligopoly with private information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 449-455, May.
    5. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2015. "Cournot competition and the social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 466-506.
    6. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Policy with Dispersed Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 11-60, March.
    7. Goldstein, Itay & Yang, Liyan, 2019. "Good disclosure, bad disclosure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 118-138.
    8. Ichiro Fukunaga, 2007. "Imperfect Common Knowledge, Staggered Price Setting, and the Effects of Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(7), pages 1711-1739, October.
    9. Jonathan G James & Phillip Lawler, 2017. "Optimal Transparency and Policy Intervention with Heterogeneous Signals and Information Stickiness," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 577-600, September.
    10. Baeriswyl, Romain & Cornand, Camille, 2010. "The signaling role of policy actions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 682-695, September.
    11. Xu Jiang & Ying Xue, 2023. "Morale, performance and disclosure," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 5-23, February.
    12. Jin Yeub Kim & Myungkyu Shim, 2022. "Information Inequality and the Role of Public Information," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 38, pages 207-230.
    13. Horváth, Roman & Jonášová, Júlia, 2015. "Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 229-243.
    14. Gabriel Desgranges & Celine Rochon, 2008. "Conformism, Public News and Market Effciency," OFRC Working Papers Series 2008fe16, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    15. Boun My, Kene & Cornand, Camille & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2021. "Public information and the concern for coordination," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    16. Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2013. "Asymmetric information and rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 789-804, November.
    17. Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2017. "The social value of information and the competition motive: Price vs. quantity games," Working Papers halshs-01614815, HAL.
    18. Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The Social Value of Transparency and Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Asymmetric Public Good Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Coenen, Günter & Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Nakov, Anton & Nardelli, Stefano & Persson, Eric & Strasser, Georg H., 2017. "Communication of monetary policy in unconventional times," CFS Working Paper Series 578, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    20. Drenik, Andrés & Perez, Diego J., 2020. "Price setting under uncertainty about inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 23-38.
    21. Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2010. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 866-907.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stackelberg competition; Cournot competition; First and second mover advantages; Public and private information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:27-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.