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Organising the Monies of Corporate Financial Crimes via Organisational Structures: Ostensible Legitimacy, Effective Anonymity, and Third-Party Facilitation

Author

Listed:
  • Nicholas Lord

    (Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK)

  • Karin Van Wingerde

    (Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands)

  • Liz Campbell

    (School of Law, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, UK)

Abstract

This article analyses how the monies generated for, and from, corporate financial crimes are controlled, concealed, and converted through the use of organisational structures in the form of otherwise legitimate corporate entities and arrangements that serve as vehicles for the management of illicit finances. Unlike the illicit markets and associated ‘organised crime groups’ and ‘criminal enterprises’ that are the normal focus of money laundering studies, corporate financial crimes involve ostensibly legitimate businesses operating within licit, transnational markets. Within these scenarios, we see corporations as primary offenders, as agents, and as facilitators of the administration of illicit finances. In all cases, organisational structures provide opportunities for managing illicit finances that individuals alone cannot access, but which require some element of third-party collaboration. In this article, we draw on data generated from our Partnership for Conflict, Crime, and Security Research (PaCCS)-funded project on the misuse of corporate structures and entities to manage illicit finances to make a methodological and substantive addition to the literature in this area. We analyse two cases from our research—corporate bribery in international business and corporate tax fraud—before discussing three main findings: (1) the ostensible legitimacy created through abuse of otherwise lawful business arrangements; (2) the effective anonymity and insulation afforded through such misuse; and (3) the necessity for facilitation by third-party professionals operating within a stratified market. The analysis improves our understanding of how and why business offenders misuse what are otherwise legitimate business structures, arrangements, and practices in their criminal enterprise.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas Lord & Karin Van Wingerde & Liz Campbell, 2018. "Organising the Monies of Corporate Financial Crimes via Organisational Structures: Ostensible Legitimacy, Effective Anonymity, and Third-Party Facilitation," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jadmsc:v:8:y:2018:i:2:p:17-:d:147917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, 2014. "The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 65-91, February.
    6. Findley, Michael G. & Nielson, Daniel L. & Sharman, J.C., 2013. "Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation1," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 657-693, October.
    7. Clarissa Annemarie Meerts, 2018. "The Organisation as the Cure for Its Own Ailments: Corporate Investigators in The Netherlands," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-15, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Judith Van Erp, 2018. "The Organization of Corporate Crime: Introduction to Special Issue of Administrative Sciences," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-12, July.
    2. Konovalova, Mayya & Tuck, Penelope & Ormeño Pérez, Rodrigo, 2023. "In search of the owner: Regulating through transparency," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    3. Cintia Rodrigues de Oliveira & Rafael Alcadipani da Silveira, 2021. "An Essay on Corporate Crimes in the Post-Colonial Perspective: Challenging Traditional Literature," RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), ANPAD - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração, vol. 25(4), pages 190144-1901.
    4. Bahoo, Salman & Alon, Ilan & Paltrinieri, Andrea, 2020. "Corruption in international business: A review and research agenda," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4).
    5. Clarissa Annemarie Meerts, 2018. "The Organisation as the Cure for Its Own Ailments: Corporate Investigators in The Netherlands," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-15, June.

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