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Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation1

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  • Findley, Michael G.
  • Nielson, Daniel L.
  • Sharman, J.C.

Abstract

Efforts to fight international money laundering, corruption, and terrorist financing depend crucially on the prohibition barring the formation of anonymous shell companies. To study the effectiveness of this prohibition, we perform the first international relations (IR) field experiment on a global scale. With university institutional review board (IRB) clearance, we posed as consultants requesting confidential incorporation from 1,264 firms in 182 countries. Testing arguments drawn from IR theory, we probe the treatment effects of specifying (1) the international standards (managerialism), (2) penalties for noncompliance with these standards (rationalism), (3) the desire to follow norms through complying with international standards (constructivism), and (4) status as a U.S. customer. We find that firms prompted about possible legal penalties for violating standards (rationalism) were significantly less likely to respond to inquiries and less likely to comply with international law compared to the placebo condition. Some evidence also suggests that the constructivist condition caused significantly greater rates of noncompliance. The U.S. origin condition and the managerial condition had no significant effects on compliance rates. These results present anomalies for leading theories and underscore the importance of determining causal effects in IR research.

Suggested Citation

  • Findley, Michael G. & Nielson, Daniel L. & Sharman, J.C., 2013. "Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation1," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 657-693, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:67:y:2013:i:04:p:657-693_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicholas R. Jenkins & Michelangelo Landgrave & Gabriel E. Martinez, 2020. "Do political donors have greater access to government officials? Evidence from a FOIA field experiment with US municipalities," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 3(2).
    2. Heidi Hardt, 2018. "Who matters for memory: Sources of institutional memory in international organization crisis management," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 457-482, September.
    3. David H. Bearce & Thomas R. Cook, 2018. "The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 595-619, December.
    4. Nathan M. Jensen & Michael G. Findley & Daniel L. Nielson, 2020. "Electoral Institutions and Electoral Cycles in Investment Incentives: A Field Experiment on Over 3,000 U.S. Municipalities," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 807-822, October.
    5. Nicholas Lord & Karin Van Wingerde & Liz Campbell, 2018. "Organising the Monies of Corporate Financial Crimes via Organisational Structures: Ostensible Legitimacy, Effective Anonymity, and Third-Party Facilitation," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, May.
    6. Dustin Tingley, 2014. "Survey Research in International Political Economy: Motivations, Designs, Methods," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(3), pages 443-451, May.

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