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Detecting Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement. A Cluster Analysis Approach

Author

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  • Mihail Busu

    (Faculty of Business Administration in Foreign Languages, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, 010374 Bucharest, Romania)

  • Cristian Busu

    (Faculty of Management, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, 010374 Bucharest, Romania)

Abstract

This paper analyses the public procurement auctions for snow removal contracts to find out whether bid-rigging occurred. Due to the limited participation in the auction processes, detection of anticompetitive agreements was possible. The econometric analysis used in our study supported the findings of a cartel agreement. Cluster analysis, statistical hypothesis, normality and symmetry and nonparametric tests reveal two types of auctions: competitive and noncompetitive bids. The aim of this paper is to analyze the public procurement auctions with nonparametric statistical methods. Our findings are in line with the literature in the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihail Busu & Cristian Busu, 2021. "Detecting Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement. A Cluster Analysis Approach," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jadmsc:v:11:y:2021:i:1:p:13-:d:497113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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