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Pink and Poverty Taxes on Marriage

Author

Listed:
  • Elias Ilin
  • Laurence J. Kotlikoff
  • M. Melinda Pitts

Abstract

A "pink tax" is the extra cost charged for goods and services esigned for women. In this research, we expand the scope of this pink tax by examining gender and income differentials in marriage taxes. A marriage tax reflects the decline in spending power as a result of the difference in taxes and transfer benefits that arise from marriage. We use a lifetime measure of the marriage tax and show that low-income females with children are penalized the most, with a loss of 3.35 percent of their lifetime resources because of marriage. This marriage tax also makes a significant difference to their marriage decisions. The marriage rate for low-income females with children would be 13 percentage points higher without this marriage penalty.

Suggested Citation

  • Elias Ilin & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & M. Melinda Pitts, 2022. "Pink and Poverty Taxes on Marriage," Policy Hub, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 2022(12), October.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:a00068:96690
    DOI: 10.29338/ph2022-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Darryl Koehler & Manni Yu, 2017. "Is Uncle Sam Inducing the Elderly to Retire?," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 1-42.
    2. Linda Waite, 1995. "Does marriage matter?," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 32(4), pages 483-507, November.
    3. Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Darryl Koehler, 2023. "US Inequality and Fiscal Progressivity: An Intragenerational Accounting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1249-1293.
    4. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Jenna Stearns, 2016. "Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 79-102, Spring.
    5. Elias Ilin & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Melinda Pitts, 2022. "Is Our Fiscal System Discouraging Marriage? A New Look at the Marriage Tax," NBER Working Papers 30159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. David Altig & Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Elias Ilin & Victor Ye, 2020. "The Marginal Net Taxation of Americans’ Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 27164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, 1997. "'Til Death or Taxes Do Us Part: The Effect of Income Taxation on Divorce," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(2), pages 388-412.
    8. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, February.
    9. James Alm & Leslie Whittington, 2003. "Shacking Up or Shelling Out: Income Taxes, Marriage, and Cohabitation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 169-186, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage taxation; disincentives; marriage; social safety net; income tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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