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Can Pro-Marriage Policies Work? An Analysis of Marginal Marriages

Author

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  • Frimmel, Wolfgang

    (University of Linz)

  • Halla, Martin

    (WU Vienna University of Economics and Business)

  • Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf

    (Johannes Kepler University Linz)

Abstract

Policies to promote marriage are controversial, and it is unclear whether they are successful. To analyze such policies, it is essential to distinguish between a marriage that is created by a marriage-promoting policy (marginal marriage) and a marriage that would have been formed even in the absence of a state intervention (average marriage). In this paper, we exploit the suspension of a cash-on-hand marriage subsidy in Austria to examine the differential behavior of marginal and average marriages. The announcement of this suspension led to an enormous marriage boom (plus 350 percent) among eligible couples that allows us to identify marginal marriages. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we show that marginal marriages are surprisingly as stable as average marriages, but have fewer children and have them later in marriage. Notably, the children born to marginal marriages are similar in terms of health at birth.

Suggested Citation

  • Frimmel, Wolfgang & Halla, Martin & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, 2012. "Can Pro-Marriage Policies Work? An Analysis of Marginal Marriages," IZA Discussion Papers 6704, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6704
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Frimmel & Martin Halla & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2016. "How Does Parental Divorce Affect Children's Long-term Outcomes?," Working Papers 2016-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    2. Deborah Goldschmidt & Wolfram Klosterhuber & Johannes F Schmieder, 2017. "Identifying couples in administrative data [Identifizierung von Ehepaaren in Administrativen Daten]," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 50(1), pages 29-43, August.
    3. Ho Lun Wong, 2021. "Effect of marriage registration on fertility and intrahousehold distribution in Thailand," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 312-338, August.
    4. Petra Persson, 2020. "Social Insurance and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(1), pages 252-300.
    5. Fink, Alexander, 2016. "Income taxation and the timing of marriage," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145827, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Martha J. Bailey & Emily A. Beam & Anna Wentz, 2021. "Does younger age at marriage affect divorce? Evidence from Johnson's Executive Order 11241," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1328-1345, July.
    7. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," EconomiX Working Papers 2021-16, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    8. Josefine Koebe & Jan Marcus, 2022. "The Length of Schooling and the Timing of Family Formation [Income Taxes and the Timing of Marital Decisions]," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 68(1), pages 1-45.
    9. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-03156317, HAL.
    10. Josefine Koebe & Jan Marcus, 2020. "The Impact of the Length of Schooling on the Timing of Family Formation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1896, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Gloria Moroni, 2018. "Explaining Divorce Gaps in Cognitive and Noncognitive Skills of Children," Discussion Papers 18/16, Department of Economics, University of York.
    12. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," Working Papers halshs-03156317, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    divorce; marriage subsidies; marriage-promoting policies; marital instability; fertility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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