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Lucro líquido do franqueado: um sinal para a escolha de franquia em época de crise

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  • Calderon Monge, María Esther
  • Huerta, Pilar Angelica

Abstract

This paper adopts the perspective of Theory of Signals to discuss how someone starting a business as a franchisee for the first time can choose a suitable franchise brand. The aim was to analyze the relationship between certain signals sent by the franchisor and the choice of a franchise brand by the prospective franchisee. Using panel data, we found that the effects of macroeconomic variables in Spain for the 2006-2013 crisis period influenced franchisees’ net income, which thus became a relevant signal in their process of choosing a franchise brand to start a business

Suggested Citation

  • Calderon Monge, María Esther & Huerta, Pilar Angelica, 2015. "Lucro líquido do franqueado: um sinal para a escolha de franquia em época de crise," RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil), vol. 55(6), November.
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:eaerae:v:55:y:2015:i:6:a:57583
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gallini, Nancy T & Lutz, Nancy A, 1992. "Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 471-501, October.
    2. Insuk Cheong & Jeong‐Yoo Kim, 2004. "Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 121-132, March.
    3. Rajagopal, 2007. "Optimizing Franchisee Sales and Business Performance in Retail Food Sector," Marketing Working Papers 2007-06-MKT, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México.
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