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The optimal decisions in franchising under profit uncertainty

Author

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  • Liang, Hueimei
  • Lee, Kuo-Jung
  • Huang, Jen-Tsung
  • Lei, Hsien-Wei

Abstract

This study constructs a real options model to evaluate franchise contracts that take into account a guaranteed profit offered by the franchisor to franchisees under a dynamic environment, as in the contract of 7-Eleven Convenient Stores in Taiwan. We derive closed-form solutions of contract values for the franchisor and franchisee. We also calculate the expected value of the guaranteed profit, which is reflected in the franchise fee. Corresponding numerical analysis is then conducted for different scenarios with respect to expected profit, the level of guaranteed profits, and profit volatilities. These results show that the contract values for both franchisor and franchisees are high if the franchise is lucrative. Higher guaranteed profit increases the value of franchisees while it decreases that of the franchisor, and the influence magnitude grows in a more volatile business environment. However, if the gross profits are stably high, then guaranteed profit is unlikely exercised and hence has less impact on the contract values of either party. Based on these findings, implications and suggestions are given.

Suggested Citation

  • Liang, Hueimei & Lee, Kuo-Jung & Huang, Jen-Tsung & Lei, Hsien-Wei, 2013. "The optimal decisions in franchising under profit uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 128-137.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:128-137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.044
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    Cited by:

    1. Esther Calderón-Monge & Pilar Huerta-Zavala & Jannett Ayup-González, 2019. "Effects of brand-related and market signals on franchisees’ entrepreneurial decisions: a multi-country panel data analysis," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 573-588, June.
    2. Ilir Hajdini & Josef Windsperger, 2020. "Real options in franchise contracting: an application of transaction cost and real options theory," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 313-337, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Franchise contract; Franchise fee; Real options; Guaranteed profit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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