IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jrefec/v34y2007i2p189-206.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sorting, Franchising and Real Estate Brokerage Firms

Author

Listed:
  • John Benjamin
  • Peter Chinloy
  • Daniel Winkler

Abstract

Real estate markets remain localized and reflect differences by region. With a large number of brokerage firms and a smaller number of franchisors, a testable hypothesis is whether in equilibrium fees and royalties are equal to the additional return to the franchisee. If fees are set uniformly across the country, economic rents may be earned in specific local markets. Some franchisees may earn excess profits from the franchise arrangement. Empirical results for 1,143 United States residential brokerage firms in 2001 show standardized uniform franchising costs cover any added returns to franchises in the Midwest and South. Excess returns are present for franchisees in the Northeast. The probability of being a franchisee increases with size and scale. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • John Benjamin & Peter Chinloy & Daniel Winkler, 2007. "Sorting, Franchising and Real Estate Brokerage Firms," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 189-206, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:34:y:2007:i:2:p:189-206
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-007-9008-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11146-007-9008-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11146-007-9008-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John R. Knight & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 1994. "List price signaling and buyer behavior in the housing market," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, pages 177-195.
    2. Martin, Robert E, 1988. "Franchising and Risk Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 954-968, December.
    3. James R. Frew & G. Donald Jud, 1986. "The Value of a Real Estate Franchise," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 14(2), pages 374-383, June.
    4. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    5. Anderson, Randy I & Lewis, Danielle & Zumpano, Leonard V, 2000. "Residential Real Estate Brokerage Efficiency from a Cost and Profit Perspective," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 295-310, May.
    6. Gallini, Nancy T & Lutz, Nancy A, 1992. "Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 471-501, October.
    7. Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1997. "Brokerage Pricing under Competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 102-117, January.
    8. Marsha L. Richins & William C. Black & C.F. Sirmans, 1987. "Strategic Orientation and Marketing Strategy: An Analysis of Residential Real Estate Brokerage Firms," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 2(2), pages 41-54.
    9. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
    10. Leonard V. Zumpano & Harold W. Elder & Randy I. Anderson, 2000. "The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: An Overview of Past Performance and Future Prospects," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 19(2), pages 189-208.
    11. Jud, G Donald & Rogers, Ronald C & Crellin, Glenn E, 1994. "Franchising and Real Estate Brokerage," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 87-93, January.
    12. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2002. "The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting," NBER Working Papers 8868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Michael J. Mazzeo, 2002. "Competitive Outcomes in Product-Differentiated Oligopoly," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(4), pages 716-728, November.
    14. Danielle Lewis & Randy Anderson, 1999. "Residential Real Estate Brokerage Efficiency and the Implications of Franchising: A Bayesian Approach," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 543-560, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chang, Zheng, 2018. "Information Barriers, Housing Searches, and Residential Satisfaction: A Study of Mainland China Students in Hong Kong," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 21(3), pages 343-365.
    2. Jonathan Wiley & Justin Benefield & Marcus Allen, 2014. "Cyclical Determinants of Brokerage Commission Rates," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 196-219, January.
    3. Han, Lu & Strange, William C., 2015. "The Microstructure of Housing Markets," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 813-886, Elsevier.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John D. Benjamin & Peter Chinloy & Donald Jud & Daniel T. Winkler, 2006. "Franchising in Residential Brokerage," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(1), pages 61-70.
    2. John D. Benjamin & G. Donald Jud & G. Stacy Sirmans, 2000. "What Do We Know About Real Estate Brokerage?," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 5-30.
    3. John D. Benjamin & G. Donald Jud & G. Stacy Sirmans, 2000. "Real Estate Brokerage and the Hosting Market: An Annotated Bibliography," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 217-278.
    4. Francine Lafontaine & Joanne E. Oxley, 2004. "International Franchising Practices in Mexico: Do Franchisors Customize Their Contracts?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 95-123, March.
    5. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
    6. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2005. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 131-150, Spring.
    7. Michael, Steven C., 2000. "The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 295-318, November.
    8. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September.
    9. Maruyama, Masayoshi & Yamashita, Yu, 2010. "The logic of franchise contracts: Empirical results of Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 183-192, August.
    10. Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger & Muriel Fadairo, 2018. "Entrepreneurial orientation, risk and incentives: the case of franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 163-180, January.
    11. Muriel Fadairo & Cyntia Lanchimba & Miguel Yangari, 2016. "Optimal Monetary Provisions and Risk Aversion in Plural Form Franchise Network. A Model of Incentives with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 1602, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    12. Liang, Hueimei & Lee, Kuo-Jung & Huang, Jen-Tsung & Lei, Hsien-Wei, 2013. "The optimal decisions in franchising under profit uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 128-137.
    13. Gagné, Robert & Sigué, Simon Pierre & Zaccour, Georges, 1998. "Droit d’entrée et taux de redevance dans les franchises d’exploitation au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 651-668, décembre.
    14. Kranz, Sebastian & Lewin-Solomons, Shira B., 2008. "Decision Structures in Franchise Systems of the Plural Form," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    15. Benito Arruñada & Luis Vázquez & Giorgio Zanarone, 2009. "Institutional constraints on organizations: the case of Spanish car dealerships," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 15-26.
    16. Scott Shane & Maw-Der Foo, 1999. "New Firm Survival: Institutional Explanations for New Franchisor Mortality," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(2), pages 142-159, February.
    17. Chen, Jean Jinghan & Dimou, Irini, 2005. "Expansion strategy of international hotel firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(12), pages 1730-1740, December.
    18. Jonathan Wiley & Justin Benefield & Marcus Allen, 2014. "Cyclical Determinants of Brokerage Commission Rates," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 196-219, January.
    19. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba & Miguel Yangari, 2016. "Optimal Monetary Provisions and Risk Aversion in Plural Form Franchise Networks A Model of Incentives with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers halshs-01251344, HAL.
    20. Heiko Karle & Christian Staat, 2013. "Signaling Quality with Initially Reduced Royalty Rates," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-44, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:34:y:2007:i:2:p:189-206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.