El intangible como problema conceptual y la ficción del valor razonable
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- Galindo Lucas, ALFONSO, 2007. "El Intangible Como Problema Conceptual Y La Ficción Del Valor Razonable [Intangible assets as a conceptual problem and the fiction of fair value (in Spanish)]," MPRA Paper 2160, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2007.
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Keywords
La contabilización de los activos intangibles es conveniente para la empresa; en un enfoque institucional; pero no encuentra necesariamente una justificación teórica válida. En el supuesto de información perfecta y empresa en funcionamiento; se demuestra que el concepto de intangible representa un problema teórico. En la vida real; en que a veces dicha información ni siquiera existe; ni se dan otros supuestos teóricos; la obtención del “valor razonable” de dichos activos se convierte en una ficción contable (y por lo tanto fiscal). Otro problema célebre; el de los activos materiales fijos; se añade a la idea de que ninguna empresa es rentable; desde el punto de vista teórico.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- M19 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Other
- B59 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Other
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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