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Sobornos o Representación Democrática: ¿Qué promueven los concejos municipales en una democracia precaria en el nivel local?

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  • Andrés Cendales
  • Jhon James Mora

Abstract

En el contexto de una democracia precaria en el nivel local, este artículo demuestra que si el concejo está controlado mayoritariamente por concejales que promueven agendas políticas con las cuales se busca que los individuos económicamente más solventes y políticamente más fuertes tengan una mayor y mejor participación en la provisión pública de bienes y servicios, ésta representación es inestable una vez el concejo favorece en el proceso de negociación política única y exclusivamente los sobornos que reciba del alcalde a cambio de no imponer su veto sobre la agenda política propuesta, i.e., la representación mayoritaria que los individuos mejor situados en la economía municipal logran en el concejo, antes que favorecerles en algún grado, solo promueve la instauración de un equilibrio políticamente estable de un estado depredador en el nivel local.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2014. "Sobornos o Representación Democrática: ¿Qué promueven los concejos municipales en una democracia precaria en el nivel local?," Documentos de Trabajo 12412, Universidad Católica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000444:012412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cendales, Andrés & Mora, Jhon & Arroyo, Santiago, 2015. "Sobre las democracias locales en el Pacífico colombiano y su incidencia en la política pública de agua potable en el periodo 2008-2011," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, issue 83, pages 161-192, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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