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Be careful what you wish for: the stock market reactions to bailing out large financial institutions

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  • Elijah Brewer
  • Ann Marie Klingenhagen

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the implicit subsidies received, in the form of stock market returns, from the perception that large banking organizations are too big to fail, and implications for financial regulation. Design/methodology/approach - The empirical analysis focuses on the responses of stock prices of various size groups of banking organizations to announcement of government capital injections to banks (troubled assets relief program) during the 2008 financial crisis, and summarizes responses of regulatory authorities to the crisis. Findings - The paper finds positive and statistically significant stock return reactions both for a portfolio of the large banking organizations that are part of the initial capital injection plan and a portfolio of the large banking organizations that are not part of the initial capital injection plan, implying a too‐big‐to‐fail (TBTF) effect, especially for the latter group of institutions. Research limitations/implications - The paper focuses on a short time frame of stock price reactions to specific events, for the largest US banks. Further examination of longer‐term stock price effects on US as well as foreign banks may be of interest. Practical implications - The results have implications for the manner and scope of financial regulatory actions and changes in regulators' approaches to systemic risk and individual bank regulation. Originality/value - The paper examines TBTF bank subsidy effects in response to a rapidly unfolding financial crisis. These have implications for longer term responses, particularly in the regulatory sphere.

Suggested Citation

  • Elijah Brewer & Ann Marie Klingenhagen, 2010. "Be careful what you wish for: the stock market reactions to bailing out large financial institutions," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 18(1), pages 56-69, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:18:y:2010:i:1:p:56-69
    DOI: 10.1108/13581981011019633
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kane, Edward J, 2000. "Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 671-701, August.
    2. Gary H. Stern, 2008. "Too big to fail: the way forward," The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 22(Dec), pages 2-6.
    3. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2007. "How much would banks be willing to pay to become \"too-big-to-fail\" and to capture other benefits?," Research Working Paper RWP 07-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    4. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    5. Malatesta, Paul H., 1986. "Measuring Abnormal Performance: The Event Parameter Approach Using Joint Generalized Least Squares," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 27-38, March.
    6. George G. Kaufman, 1990. "Are Some Banks Too Large To Fail? Myth And Reality," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, October.
    7. Binder, John J, 1988. "The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Railroad Cartels," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 443-468, October.
    8. Kaufman, George G., 2002. "Too big to fail in banking: What remains?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 423-436.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abreu, José Filipe & Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim, 2013. "The stock market reaction to the public announcement of a supranational list of too-big-to-fail banks during the financial crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 49-72.
    2. Andrieș, Alin Marius & Nistor, Simona & Ongena, Steven & Sprincean, Nicu, 2020. "On Becoming an O-SII (“Other Systemically Important Institution”)," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    3. Elshahat, A. & Parhizgari, Ali & Hong, Liang, 2012. "The information content of the Banking Regulatory Agencies and the Depository Credit Intermediation Institutions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 90-104.

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