Are Some Banks Too Large To Fail? Myth And Reality
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1990.tb00298.x
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 277-283, June.
- George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1988. "Risk and solvency regulation of depository institutions: past policies and current options," Staff Memoranda 88-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Philip Cagan, 1965. "Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number caga65-1.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Mr. George G. Kaufman & Mr. Steven A. Seelig, 2001. "Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks: Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail," IMF Working Papers 2001/083, International Monetary Fund.
- Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2013.
"How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?,"
Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35, February.
- Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2009. "How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systemically important?," Working Papers 09-34, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2011. "How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systematically important?," Working Papers 11-37, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Wall, Larry D. & Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Frame, W. Scott, 2005.
"Resolving large financial intermediaries: Banks versus housing enterprises,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 386-425, April.
- Robert A. Eisenbeis & W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall, 2004. "Resolving large financial intermediaries: banks versus housing enterprises," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 1999. "Bond market discipline of banks: is the market tough enough?," Staff Reports 95, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Naoise McDonagh, 2021. "The evolution of bank bailout policy: two centuries of variation, selection and retention," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 1065-1088, July.
- George Kaufman, 2000. "Comment on Benston and Wood," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 18(2), pages 235-239, December.
- Colvin, Christopher L. & de Jong, Abe & Fliers, Philip T., 2015.
"Predicting the past: Understanding the causes of bank distress in the Netherlands in the 1920s,"
Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 97-121.
- Christopher L. Colvin & Abe de Jong & Philip T. Fliers, 2013. "Predicting the Past: Understanding the Causes of Bank Distress in the Netherlands in the 1920s," Working Papers 0035, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
- Colvin, Christopher L. & de Jong, Abe & Fliers, Philip T., 2014. "Predicting the past: Understanding the causes of bank distress in the Netherlands in the 1920s," QUCEH Working Paper Series 14-04, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
- George G. Kaufman & Steven A. Seelig, 2000. "Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks: implications for the severity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too-big-to-fail," Working Paper Series WP-00-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Elijah Brewer & Ann Marie Klingenhagen, 2010. "Be careful what you wish for: the stock market reactions to bailing out large financial institutions," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 18(1), pages 56-69, February.
- Kaufman, George G., 2002. "Too big to fail in banking: What remains?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 423-436.
- Selgin, George & Lastrapes, William D. & White, Lawrence H., 2012. "Has the Fed been a failure?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 569-596.
- Robert L. Hetzel, 2009. "Should increased regulation of bank risk-taking come from regulators or from the market?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 95(Spr), pages 161-200.
- Binder Jens-Hinrich, 2013. "Durchsetzung von Marktdisziplin mittels zwangsweiser Übertragung systemrelevanter Teile von Banken? / The Enforcement of Market Discipline through a Transfer of Systemic Functions in Banks," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 377-404, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Bordo, Michael D., 1986.
"Explorations in monetary history: A survey of the literature,"
Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 339-415, October.
- Michael D. Bordo, 1986. "Explorations in Monetary History: A Survey of the Literature," NBER Working Papers 1821, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo, 1989.
"The Contribution of "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960" to Monetary History,"
NBER Chapters, in: Money, History, and International Finance: Essays in Honor of Anna J. Schwartz, pages 15-78,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo, 1988. "The Contribution of a Monetary History of the United States: 1867 to 1960 To Monetary History," NBER Working Papers 2549, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Claudio Borio, 2019. "On money, debt, trust and central banking," BIS Working Papers 763, Bank for International Settlements.
- Jaremski, Matthew, 2018.
"The (dis)advantages of clearinghouses before the Fed,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 435-458.
- Matthew S. Jaremski, 2017. "The (Dis)Advantages of Clearinghouses Before the Fed," NBER Working Papers 23113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gorton, Gary & Huang, Lixin, 2006.
"Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1613-1629, October.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 9102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-29, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 2007.
"Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: clearinghouse loan certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2006-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 2010. "Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: clearing house loan certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907," Working Papers (Old Series) 1010, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007.
"Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
- Acharya, Viral & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2004. "Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2007. "Too many to fail - an analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Bank of England working papers 319, Bank of England.
- Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2003.
"Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation,"
The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 16(4), pages 309-326, December.
- Caplan, Bryan & Stringham, Edward, 2003. "Networks, law, and the paradox of cooperation," MPRA Paper 26086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1995.
"The decline of traditional banking: implications for financial stability and regulatory policy,"
Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 1(Jul), pages 27-45.
- Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1995. "The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications for Financial Stabilityand Regulatory Policy," NBER Working Papers 4993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:zbw:bofrdp:2004_004 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mayes, David G. & Nieto, María J. & Wall, Larry, 2008.
"Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 232-257, September.
- David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry Wall, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Working Papers 0819, Banco de España.
- Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010.
"Haircuts,"
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(Nov), pages 507-520.
- Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2009. "Haircuts," NBER Working Papers 15273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrew Metrick & Gary Gorton, 2009. "Haircuts," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2395, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2009.
- Carlos Gustavo Cano, 2008. "Regulación y supervisión: La otra cara de la política monetaria," Borradores de Economia 4587, Banco de la Republica.
- Michael D. Bordo, 1989. "Introduction to "Money, History, and International Finance: Essays in Honor of Anna J. Schwartz"," NBER Chapters, in: Money, History, and International Finance: Essays in Honor of Anna J. Schwartz, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thorsten V. Koppl & James MacGee, 2001. "Limited enforcement and efficient interbank arrangements," Working Papers 608, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Calomiris, Charles W. & Carlson, Mark, 2017.
"Interbank networks in the National Banking Era: Their purpose and their role in the Panic of 1893,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 434-453.
- Charles W Calomiris & Mark A Carlson, 2016. "Interbank networks in the national banking era: their purpose and their role in the panic of 1893," BIS Working Papers 535, Bank for International Settlements.
- Renee Courtois Haltom & Bruno Sultanum, 2018.
"Preventing Bank Runs,"
Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue March.
- Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Sultanum, Bruno, 2017. "Preventing bank runs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
- David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Preventing Bank Runs," Working Paper Series WP-2014-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Preventing bank runs," Working Papers 2014-21, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Viral V. Acharya & Denis Gromb & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2012.
"Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 184-217, April.
- Gromb, Denis & Acharya, Viral & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2008. "Imperfect Competition in the Inter-Bank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 6984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Asaf Bernstein & Eric Hughson & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2014. "Counterparty Risk and the Establishment of the New York Stock Exchange Clearinghouse," NBER Working Papers 20459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthias Morys, 2016. "Financial supervision to fight fiscal dominance? The gold standard in Greece and South-East Europe between economic and political objectives and fiscal reality, 1841-1939," Discussion Papers 16/05, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Richard S. Grossman & Christopher M. Meissner, 2010.
"International aspects of the Great Depression and the crisis of 2007: similarities, differences, and lessons,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 26(3), pages 318-338, Autumn.
- Richard S. Grossman & Christopher M. Meissner, 2010. "International Aspects of the Great Depression and the Crisis of 2007: Similarities, Differences, and Lessons," NBER Working Papers 16269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard S. Grossman & Christopher M. Meissner, 2010. "International Aspects of the Great Depression and the Crisis of 2007: Similarities, Differences, and Lessons," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2010-002, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2010.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:8:y:1990:i:4:p:1-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.