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Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking

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  • Pop, Adrian
  • Pop, Diana

Abstract

This study examines the reaction of private market participants to the enhancement of the "Too-Big-To-Fail" (TBTF) doctrine in the Japanese banking sector. The event justifying the use of the "TBTF" label occurred on May 17th, 2003, when the Japanese government decided to bailout Resona Holdings, the 5th largest financial group in the country. By using a sample of all Japanese listed banks and the standard event study methodology, we document significant and positive wealth effects in the stock market accruing to large banks and negative (though non-significant) effects accruing to smaller banks. Besides the effect on bank equity values, we also document a significant abnormal volume of trading on days following the bailout announcement date for the largest banks only. We extend our empirical analysis on stock prices and trading volumes by detecting a significant impact in the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. This last result allows us to quantify, in a probabilistic sense, the effects of TBTF in addition to uncovering the mere presence of such a regulatory policy.

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  • Pop, Adrian & Pop, Diana, 2009. "Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1429-1459, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:49:y:2009:i:4:p:1429-1459
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    2. Bertoni, Fabio & Lugo, Stefano, 2014. "The effect of sovereign wealth funds on the credit risk of their portfolio companies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 21-35.
    3. Andres, Christian & Betzer, André & Doumet, Markus, 2021. "Measuring changes in credit risk: The case of CDS event studies," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    4. Sakawa, Hideaki & Watanabel, Naoki & Sasaki, Hitoshi & Tanahashi, Noriko, 2020. "Bank valuation and size: Evidence from Japan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    5. Cubillas, Elena & Fernández, Ana I. & González, Francisco, 2017. "How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 46-67.
    6. Stephen Kawas & Everton Dockery, 2023. "What do we know about the stock markets’ reaction to regulatory announcements regarding financial institutions? Evidence from UK financial institutions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 31-67, January.
    7. Bertoni, Fabio & Lugo, Stefano, 2018. "Detecting abnormal changes in credit default swap spreads using matching-portfolio models," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 146-158.
    8. Nicolas Dumontaux & Adrian Pop, 2012. "Contagion Effects in the Aftermath of Lehman's Collapse: Measuring the Collateral Damage," Working Papers hal-00695721, HAL.
    9. Jan Koleśnik & Anna Dąbkowska, 2021. "Methods for alleviating the problem of Too big to fail in Germany," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(1), pages 11-23, March.
    10. Dumontaux, Nicolas & Pop, Adrian, 2013. "Understanding the market reaction to shockwaves: Evidence from the failure of Lehman Brothers," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 269-286.
    11. Abreu, José Filipe & Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim, 2013. "The stock market reaction to the public announcement of a supranational list of too-big-to-fail banks during the financial crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 49-72.
    12. Tran, Dung Viet & Hussain, Nazim & Nguyen, Duc Khuong & Nguyen, Trung Duc, 2024. "How do depositors respond to banks' discretionary behaviors? Evidence from market discipline, deposit insurance, and scale effects," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    13. Dumontaux, N. & Pop, A., 2013. "Contagion Effects in the Aftermath of Lehman’s Collapse: Evidence from the US Financial Services Industry," Working papers 427, Banque de France.

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