IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/intfin/v25y2013icp49-72.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The stock market reaction to the public announcement of a supranational list of too-big-to-fail banks during the financial crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Abreu, José Filipe
  • Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim

Abstract

In the aftermath of the global financial meltdown, regulators initiated a process to strengthen the regulation of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks with two goals: first, to increase the ability of these banks to absorb future financial shocks and second, to weaken the market expectation of public support for these banks in the event of a future financial crisis, thereby reducing the moral hazard problem associated with TBTF banks. We use an event study approach to analyze the market reaction to the official designation of a list of banks as TBTF by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (on November 4, 2011). We do not find abnormal returns surrounding the FSB public announcement, which indicates that identifying the TBTF banks did not reduce the moral hazard problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Abreu, José Filipe & Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim, 2013. "The stock market reaction to the public announcement of a supranational list of too-big-to-fail banks during the financial crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 49-72.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:25:y:2013:i:c:p:49-72
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2013.01.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443113000048
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.intfin.2013.01.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 224-255, September.
    2. Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. "Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-1377, September.
    3. Bigus, Jochen & Prigge, Stefan, 2005. "When risk premiums decrease as the bank's risk increases--a caveat on the use of subordinated bonds as an instrument of banking supervision," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 369-390, October.
    4. Adrian Pop & Diana Pop, 2009. "Requiem for Market Discipline and the Specter of TBTF in Japanese Banking," Working Papers hal-00419235, HAL.
    5. Roger Ferguson, 1999. "Alternative Approaches to Financial Supervision and Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 297-303, December.
    6. Clare, Andrew D, 1995. "Using the Arbitrage Pricing Theory to Calculate the Probability of Financial Institution Failure: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 920-926, August.
    7. Larry D. Wall, 2010. "Too-big-to-fail after FDICIA," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 95(1).
    8. Kaufman, George G., 2002. "Too big to fail in banking: What remains?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 423-436.
    9. Kane, Edward J, 2000. "Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 671-701, August.
    10. Eric Rosengren, 1999. "Modernizing Financial Regulation: Implications for Bank Supervision," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 117-123, December.
    11. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, December.
    12. Corrado, Charles J. & Zivney, Terry L., 1992. "The Specification and Power of the Sign Test in Event Study Hypothesis Tests Using Daily Stock Returns," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 465-478, September.
    13. Richard W. Fisher, 2010. "COMMENTARY: International Lessons for Regulatory Reform," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 311-320, August.
    14. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Roger, Benoit, 2004. "The three pillars of Basel II: optimizing the mix," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 132-155, April.
    15. Pop, Adrian & Pop, Diana, 2009. "Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1429-1459, November.
    16. Ahern, Kenneth R., 2009. "Sample selection and event study estimation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 466-482, June.
    17. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    18. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    19. Otmar Issing, 2009. "Some Lessons from the Financial Market Crisis," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 431-444, December.
    20. Elijah Brewer & Ann Marie Klingenhagen, 2010. "Be careful what you wish for: the stock market reactions to bailing out large financial institutions," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 18(1), pages 56-69, February.
    21. Fama, Eugene F, et al, 1969. "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, February.
    22. Avery, Robert B & Belton, Terrence M & Goldberg, Michael A, 1988. "Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(4), pages 597-610, November.
    23. Brown, Stephen J. & Warner, Jerold B., 1985. "Using daily stock returns : The case of event studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-31, March.
    24. William F. Sharpe, 1964. "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 425-442, September.
    25. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 2005. "Too big to fail after all these years," Staff Reports 220, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    26. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. De Novellis, G. & Musile Tanzi, P. & Ranalli, M.G. & Stanghellini, E., 2024. "Leveraged finance exposure in the banking system: Systemic risk and interconnectedness," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Moch Nils, 2018. "The Contribution of Large Banking Institutions to Systemic Risk: What Do We Know? A Literature Review," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 69(3), pages 231-257, December.
    3. Allen, Kyle D. & Cyree, Ken B. & Whitledge, Matthew D. & Winters, Drew B., 2018. "An event study analysis of too-big-to-fail after the Dodd-Frank act: Who is too big to fail?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 19-31.
    4. Bańbuła, Piotr & Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Małgorzata, 2016. "The systemic importance of banks – name and shame seems to work," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 297-301.
    5. Wojewodzki, Michal & Boateng, Agyenim & Brahma, Sanjukta, 2020. "Credit rating, banks' capital structure and speed of adjustment: A cross-country analysis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Degryse, Hans & Mariathasan, Mike & Tang, Hien T., 2023. "GSIB status and corporate lending," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    7. Andrieș, Alin Marius & Nistor, Simona & Ongena, Steven & Sprincean, Nicu, 2020. "On Becoming an O-SII (“Other Systemically Important Institution”)," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    8. Stephen Kawas & Everton Dockery, 2023. "What do we know about the stock markets’ reaction to regulatory announcements regarding financial institutions? Evidence from UK financial institutions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 31-67, January.
    9. Meuleman, Elien & Vander Vennet, Rudi, 2020. "Macroprudential policy and bank systemic risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    10. Bongini, Paola & Nieri, Laura & Pelagatti, Matteo & Piccini, Andrea, 2017. "Curbing systemic risk in the insurance sector: A mission impossible?," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 256-273.
    11. Moutsianas, Konstantinos A. & Kosmidou, Kyriaki, 2016. "Bank earnings volatility in the UK: Does size matter? A comparison between commercial and investment banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 137-150.
    12. Degryse, Hans & Mariathasan, Mike & Tang, Thi Hien, 2020. "GSIB status and corporate lending: An international analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 15564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Gündüz, Yalin, 2020. "The market impact of systemic risk capital surcharges," Discussion Papers 09/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    14. Markoulis, Stelios & Martzoukos, Spiridon & Patsalidou, Elena, 2022. "Global systemically important banks regulation: Blessing or curse?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    15. Egger, Peter H. & Li, Jie & Zhu, Jiaqing, 2023. "The network and own effects of global-systemically-important-bank designations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    16. Bongini, Paola & Nieri, Laura & Pelagatti, Matteo, 2015. "The importance of being systemically important financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 562-574.
    17. Silvia Bressan & Alex Weissensteiner, 2023. "Option-Implied Skewness and the Value of Financial Intermediaries," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 207-229, October.
    18. Silva, Walmir & Kimura, Herbert & Sobreiro, Vinicius Amorim, 2017. "An analysis of the literature on systemic financial risk: A survey," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 91-114.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pop, Adrian & Pop, Diana, 2009. "Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1429-1459, November.
    2. J. Christian Ola & Eric Sartell, 2016. "Undercover Boss: Stripping Away the Disguise to Analyze the Financial Performance of Participating Firm," Business, Management and Economics Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 2(12), pages 186-192, 12-2016.
    3. Philip E. Strahan, 2013. "Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 43-61, November.
    4. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2009. "Does banks size distort market prices? Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2009,06, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Julia Lackmann & Jürgen Ernstberger & Michael Stich, 2012. "Market Reactions to Increased Reliability of Sustainability Information," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 107(2), pages 111-128, May.
    6. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2011. "Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-210, March.
    7. Andres, Christian & Betzer, André & Doumet, Markus, 2021. "Measuring changes in credit risk: The case of CDS event studies," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    8. Wijayana, Singgih & Gray, Sidney J., 2018. "Capital market consequences of cultural influences on earnings: The case of cross-listed firms in the U.S. stock market," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 134-147.
    9. Marc Zenzius & Christian Flore & Dirk Schiereck, 2022. "Tough times for seasoned equity offerings: performance during the COVID pandemic," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 92(9), pages 1491-1510, November.
    10. Koppenberg, Maximilian & Hirsch, Stefan & Finger, Robert, 2023. "Effects of the debate on glyphosate's carcinogenic risk on pesticide producers' share prices," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    11. Paul-Olivier KLEIN, 2017. "Do Shareholders Value Bond Offerings? A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-04, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    12. Ahmad H. Juma’h & Yazan Alnsour, 2018. "Using Social Media Analytics: The Effect of President Trump’s Tweets On Companies’ Performance," Journal of Accounting and Management Information Systems, Faculty of Accounting and Management Information Systems, The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, vol. 17(1), pages 100-121, March.
    13. Sebastien Bradley & Estelle Dauchy & Makoto Hasegawa, 2018. "Investor valuations of Japan’s adoption of a territorial tax regime: quantifying the direct and competitive effects of international tax reform," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 581-630, June.
    14. Henryk Gurgul & Milena Suliga & Tomasz Wojtowicz, 2012. "Responses of the Warsaw Stock Exchange to the U.S. macroeconomic data announcements," Managerial Economics, AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 12, pages 41-59.
    15. Neelam Rani & Surendra S Yadav & P.K. Jain, 2015. "Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Shareholders’ Wealth in the Short Run: An Event Study Approach," Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, , vol. 40(3), pages 293-312, September.
    16. Günther, Susanne, 2013. "Eine ökonomische Analyse der Systemrelevanz von Banken," Arbeitspapiere 139, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    17. Asghar Zardkoohi & Eugene Kang & Donald Fraser & Albert A. Cannella, 2018. "Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior: A Too-Big-To-Fail Story," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 221-233, April.
    18. Gündüz, Yalin, 2020. "The market impact of systemic risk capital surcharges," Discussion Papers 09/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    19. Bogdan Capraru & Iulian Ihnatov & Nicu Sprincean, 2016. "Changes of Executives and Ownership in a Romanian Small Bank: an Event Study Approach," EuroEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 1(35), pages 36-46, may.
    20. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2013. "How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Too-big-to-fail; Banks; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:25:y:2013:i:c:p:49-72. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/intfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.