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Wicksell and the Scandinavian and public choice traditions

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  • Marianne Johnson

Abstract

Purpose - Wicksell's contributions to welfare economics are viewed as largely aligned with Pareto efficiency and James Buchanan's work in public choice. This conflicts with the Scandinavian representation of Wicksell as the forefather of the modern Swedish socialist economy. The purpose of this paper is to examine Wicksell's approach to economics, particularly his understanding of “justice” as a way to understanding the evolution of two such divergent traditions. Design/methodology/approach - Original academic and popular press writings, as well as archival materials, are used to examine Wicksell's economic philosophy and his position on key aspects of welfare economics, including the relative importance of allocation versus distribution in policy decision making. His influence on the American public choice tradition and Swedish welfare economics is examined. Findings - Both the public choice and Swedish welfare traditions based on Wicksell's justice represent overly simplistic interpretations and fail to explain how Wicksell could have such a significant impact on the development of two such divergent approaches to public economics. Originality/value - Wicksell's strong association with Pareto efficiency and the public choice school is unfortunate because de‐emphasizes the importance Wicksell placed on distributional considerations and overly simplifies his use of the term “justice.” Similarly, the Swedish economists failed to appreciate efficiency arguments and chose instead to emphasize Wicksell's distributional concerns. This paper sheds light on where the misapprehension arose and how it can be better understood.

Suggested Citation

  • Marianne Johnson, 2011. "Wicksell and the Scandinavian and public choice traditions," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 38(7), pages 584-594, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:38:y:2011:i:7:p:584-594
    DOI: 10.1108/03068291111139221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benny Carlson & Lars Jonung, 2006. "Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Bertil Ohlin and Gunnar Myrdal on the Role of the Economist in Public Debate," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 3(3), pages 511-550, September.
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    6. Jonung,Lars (ed.), 1991. "The Stockholm School of Economics Revisited," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521391276, October.
    7. Smith, Vernon L, 1977. "The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1125-1139, December.
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