IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eej/eeconj/v17y1991i1p89-99.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Steven Husted

    (University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

This paper uses general equilibrium modeling popularized by J. Bhagwati to explore the economic consequences of foreign financed lobbying in an open economy. It is shown that, unlike domestic lobbying, foreign lobbying need not be directly unproductive, at least in the country where the lobbying occurs. Under plausible conditions, foreign lobbying may even raise domestic welfare relative to free trade with no lobbying. Also included in the paper are some data on the level and types of foreign lobbying in the United States in 1984. Contrary to popular belief, these expenditures appear to be quite small relative to other trade flows and potential benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Husted, 1991. "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 89-99, Jan-Mar.
    • Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:17:y:1991:i:1:p:89-99
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/eej/Archive/Volume17/V17N1P89_99.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jackson, John H, 1984. "Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 277-281, May.
    2. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 113-129, Springer.
    3. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-1087, December.
    4. Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Richard A. Brecher & Tatsuo Hatta, 1985. "The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Exogenous (policy-Imposed) and Endogenous (Transfer-Induced) Distortion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(3), pages 697-714.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Larry D. Qiu, 2008. "Endogenous Lobbying Positions," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 641-653, September.
    2. Gawande, Kishore & Maloney, William & Montes-Rojas, Gabriel, 2009. "Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism: Evidence from the Caribbean," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 267-275, November.
    3. Steven Husted & James Cassing, 2006. "Lobbying as a Transport Industry," Working Paper 222, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2006.
    4. Toke S. Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2014. "To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross-National Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 272-297, February.
    5. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2014. "Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 489-505, October.
    6. Montes-Rojas, Gabriel V., 2013. "Can Poor Countries Lobby for More US Bilateral Aid?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 77-87.
    7. Aidt, T.S. & Hwang, U., 2008. "One Cheer for Foreign Lobbying," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0860, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    2. Bharat R. Hazari & Jean-Pierre Laffargue & Chi-Chur Chao & Eden S. H. Yu, 2007. "A Dynamic Analysis of Tied Aid," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00270896, HAL.
    3. Schweinberger, Albert G. & Lahiri, Sajal, 2006. "On the provision of official and private foreign aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 179-197, June.
    4. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 366-389, January.
    5. Robert E. Baldwin, 1986. "Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach," International Economic Association Series, in: Bela Balassa & Herbert Giersch (ed.), Economic Incentives, chapter 16, pages 429-453, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Michael A. Brooks & Ben J. Heudra, 1989. "An Exploration of Rent Seeking," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(1), pages 32-50, March.
    7. James Lake & Maia Linask, 2015. "Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 211-238, December.
    8. Tobias D. Ketterer, 2016. "EU Anti-dumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 576-596, May.
    9. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1986. "Tariffs, quotas and domestic-content protection: some political economy considerations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 221-242, January.
    10. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1997. "On the tying of aid to tariff reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 479-491, December.
    11. Kojun Hamada & Tsuyoshi Shinozaki & Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara, 2017. "Aspirations and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 279-301, November.
    12. Chi‐Chur Chao & Jean‐Pierre Laffargue & Pasquale M. Sgro, 2010. "Foreign Aid, Wage Inequality, and Welfare for a Small Open Economy with Tourism," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 454-464, August.
    13. Feeney, JoAnne & Hillman, Arye L., 1995. "Asset markets and individual trade policy preferences," Discussion Papers, Series II 282, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    14. Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Protection, lobbying, and market structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
    15. Bernard Hoekman, 2014. "The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, Mistake or Mirage?," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/102, European University Institute.
    16. Aaron Tornell, 1989. "Inconsistencia dinámica de los programas proteccionistas," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 4(1), pages 61-82.
    17. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    18. Michaelis, Peter, 1995. "Political competition, campaign contributions and the monopolisation of industries," Kiel Working Papers 693, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    19. David J. Kuenzel, 2023. "Non‐tariff measures: What's tariffs got to do with it?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 133-163, February.
    20. Federico Bonaglia & Jorge Braga de Macedo & Maurizio Bussolo, 2009. "How Globalisation Improves Governance," Chapters, in: Linda Yueh (ed.), The Law and Economics of Globalisation, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrium; Free Trade; Lobbying; Trade; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:17:y:1991:i:1:p:89-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eeaa1ea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.