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Institution Building with Limited Resources: Establishing a Supreme Audit Institution in Rwanda

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  • Isaksson, Ann-Sofie
  • Bigsten, Arne

Abstract

This study examines the tensions between best-practice institutional benchmarks and local operational constraints in a developing country institution-building process. Drawing on data from document studies and key informant interviews, we investigate if and how staff capacity constraints affect the achievement of the programmatic ideal of supreme audit institution (SAI) independence, and what tradeoffs this gives rise to in the development of a SAI oversight function in Rwanda. The empirical results suggest that capacity constraints negatively affect important aspects of SAI independence, and point to the need for contextual institutional solutions to safeguard independence as well as to tackle capacity constraints.

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  • Isaksson, Ann-Sofie & Bigsten, Arne, 2012. "Institution Building with Limited Resources: Establishing a Supreme Audit Institution in Rwanda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1870-1881.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:9:p:1870-1881
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.021
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    Cited by:

    1. Ionel Bostan & Mihaela Brindusa Tudose & Raluca Irina Clipa & Ionela Corina Chersan & Flavian Clipa, 2021. "Supreme Audit Institutions and Sustainability of Public Finance. Links and Evidence along the Economic Cycles," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(17), pages 1-24, August.
    2. Huseyin Cicek & Suleyman Dikmen, 2021. "External Audit And Fiscal Transparency: An Empirical Analysis," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 7-26.
    3. Benjamin Chemouni, 2017. "The politics of core public sector reform in Rwanda," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-088-17, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    4. Lino, André Feliciano & Azevedo, Ricardo Rocha de & Aquino, André Carlos Busanelli de & Steccolini, Ileana, 2022. "Fighting or supporting corruption? The role of public sector audit organizations in Brazil," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Nada Azmy ElBerry & Stijn Goeminne, 2021. "Fiscal transparency, fiscal forecasting and budget credibility in developing countries," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(1), pages 144-161, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institution building; capacity constraints; supreme audit institution; Rwanda; Africa;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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