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License to Till: The Privileges of the Spanish Mesta as a Case of Second Best Institutions

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  • Drelichman, Mauricio

Abstract

The Mesta was the association of the migratory shepherds of Castile, controlling fine wool production between the thirteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Its royally granted privileges have often been blamed for the stagnant Spanish agricultural productivity during the Early Modern period. I argue that the Mesta's privileges allowed Medieval Castile to develop its comparative advantage in wool, and that the Crown was able to restrict their scope and application when economic conditions favored arable farming interests. I support my argument with extensive archival data, including a new series of wool prices and a detailed analysis of lawsuits involving the Mesta.

Suggested Citation

  • Drelichman, Mauricio, 2006. "License to Till: The Privileges of the Spanish Mesta as a Case of Second Best Institutions," Economics working papers drelichman-06-04-24-11-33, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 03 Oct 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:ubc:bricol:drelichman-06-04-24-11-33-27
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    Cited by:

    1. Di Liberto, Adriana & Sideri, Marco, 2015. "Past dominations, current institutions and the Italian regional economic performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 12-41.
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    3. Graham Brownlow, 2015. "Back to the failure: an analytic narrative of the De Lorean debacle," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 156-181, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mesta; Institutions; Property Rights; Privileges; Enforcement; Legal Records; Spain; Castile;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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