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Collective Remittances and the State: The 3×1 Program in Mexican Municipalities

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  • Aparicio, Francisco Javier
  • Meseguer, Covadonga

Abstract

The Mexican 3×1 Program for Migrants is a grant scheme whereby the municipal, state, and federal governments match by 3 to 1 the funds that migrant clubs send to their hometowns to finance public projects. Using municipal-level data on Program participation for the period 2002–07, we evaluate both the economic bias and the political bias of the Program. Since migration and poverty have a nonlinear relationship, we find that poorer municipalities are less likely to participate than those with medium poverty levels. We also find that the Program rewards PAN strongholds rather than competitive municipalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Aparicio, Francisco Javier & Meseguer, Covadonga, 2012. "Collective Remittances and the State: The 3×1 Program in Mexican Municipalities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 206-222.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:1:p:206-222
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2002. "What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?," NBER Working Papers 9159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ernesto Calvo & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 742-757, October.
    3. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    4. Matthew R. Cleary, 2007. "Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 283-299, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David McKenzie & Dean Yang, 2015. "Evidence on Policies to Increase the Development Impacts of International Migration," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 30(2), pages 155-192.
    2. Ambrosius, Christian, 2019. "Government reactions to private substitutes for public goods: Remittances and the crowding-out of public finance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 396-415.
    3. Lisa Chauvet & Flore Gubert & Marion Mercier & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2015. "Migrants' Home Town Associations and Local Development in Mali," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(2), pages 686-722, April.
    4. Lücke, Matthias & Omar Mahmoud, Toman & Peuker, Christian, 2012. "Identifying the motives of migrant philanthropy," Kiel Working Papers 1790, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Hazan, Miryam, 2011. "Beyond 3x1: Linking sending and receiving societies in the development process," Papers 185, World Trade Institute.
    6. Licuanan, Victoria & Omar Mahmoud, Toman & Steinmayr, Andreas, 2015. "The Drivers of Diaspora Donations for Development: Evidence from the Philippines," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 94-109.
    7. Biyase, Mduduzi, 2018. "Assessing the impact of social grants on household welfare using morning after simulation and PSM approach," MPRA Paper 84477, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ley, Sandra & Ibarra-Olivo, J. Eduardo & Meseguer, Covadonga, 2019. "Family remittances and vigilantism in Mexico," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Catia Batista & Julia Seither & Pedro C. Vicente, 2017. "Migration, political institutions, and social networks," NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series wp1701, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, NOVAFRICA.
    10. Zsóka Kóczán & Franz Loyola, 2021. "How do migration and remittances affect inequality? A case study of Mexico," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(2), pages 360-381, March.
    11. Meseguer, Covadonga & Lavezzolo, Sebastián & Aparicio, Javier, 2016. "Financial remittances, trans-border conversations, and the state," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11715 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12021 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:hal:pseose:hal-01276827 is not listed on IDEAS

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