IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v23y2011i4p480-509.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Jobs in politicians’ backyards: Party leadership competition and patronage

Author

Listed:
  • Ozge Kemahlioglu

    (Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Sabanci University, Turkey, ozgekemah@sabanciuniv.edu)

Abstract

What are the factors that lead to variation in the clientelistic use of state resources in electoral contexts? In this article I provide one answer to this question by focusing on the role of intra-party politics and analyzing the empirical case of patronage jobs in the Argentine provinces between 1984 and 2001. Patronage jobs in provincial administrations help governors build political support both in their own party and with the general public. However, when governors need their party (leader)’s support for their political careers and when the national party leadership position is open to competition, they reduce their clientelistic efforts not to lose the party’s (or party leader’s) support. The statistical analysis of public employment confirms this prediction that patronage is lower when the party’s (or party leader’s) support is important for politicians and when the leadership position within parties is open to competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Ozge Kemahlioglu, 2011. "Jobs in politicians’ backyards: Party leadership competition and patronage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(4), pages 480-509, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:4:p:480-509
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629811416397
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629811416397
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629811416397?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernesto Calvo & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 742-757, October.
    2. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 2002. "On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(1), pages 27-40, March.
    3. Nichter, Simeon, 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 19-31, February.
    4. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., 1995. "What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 634-647, September.
    5. James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 260-291, April.
    6. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    7. Leonard Wantchekon, 2003. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in benin," Natural Field Experiments 00339, The Field Experiments Website.
    8. Calvo, Ernesto, 2007. "The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 263-280, April.
    9. Brambor, Thomas & Clark, William Roberts & Golder, Matt, 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-82, January.
    10. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., 2001. "Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 487-495, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paniagua, Victoria, 2022. "When clients vote for brokers: How elections improve public goods provision in urban slums," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    2. Gallego, Jorge & Li, Christopher & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2020. "Electoral Intermediaries," Working papers 45, Red Investigadores de Economía.
    3. Casas, Agustín & Díaz, Guillermo & Trindade, André, 2017. "Who monitors the monitor? Effect of party observers on electoral outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 136-149.
    4. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2018. "I Sell My Vote, and So What? Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates of Clientelism in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2018), pages 181-218, November.
    5. Prummer, Anja, 2020. "Micro-targeting and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    6. Gustavo J. Bobonis & Paul J. Gertler & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Simeon Nichter, 2022. "Vulnerability and Clientelism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(11), pages 3627-3659, November.
    7. Vladimir Shchukin & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2022. "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 3-34, January.
    8. Gallego, Jorge & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2012. "Experiments on Clientelism and Vote Buying," MPRA Paper 97060, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Marta Curto-Grau, 2017. "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 143-169, January.
    10. Keefer, Philip & Khemani, Stuti, 2014. "Radio's impact on preferences for patronage benefits," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6932, The World Bank.
    11. Nicole M. Mason & Thomas S. Jayne & Nicolas van de Walle, 2017. "The Political Economy of Fertilizer Subsidy Programs in Africa: Evidence from Zambia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(3), pages 705-731.
    12. Jeremy Bowles & Horacio Larreguy & Shelley Liu, 2020. "How Weakly Institutionalized Parties Monitor Brokers in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Postconflict Liberia," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 952-967, October.
    13. Ali, Amin Masud & Savoia, Antonio, 2023. "Decentralisation or patronage: What determines government's allocation of development spending in a unitary country? Evidence from Bangladesh," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    14. Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos & Chad Kiewiet de Jonge & Carlos Meléndez & David Nickerson & Javier Osorio, 2020. "Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(1), pages 46-61, January.
    15. Adrienne LeBas, 2017. "Who trusts? Ethnicity, integration, and attitudes toward elected officials in urban Nigeria," WIDER Working Paper Series 126, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    16. Pellicer, Miquel & Wegner, Eva, 2013. "Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 339-371, October.
    17. Amat, Francesc & Beramendi, Pablo, 2016. "Economic and Political Inequality: The Role of Political Mobilization," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 277, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    18. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos A. Molina & James A. Robinson, 2022. "The Weak State Trap," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(354), pages 293-331, April.
    19. Savu, A., 2021. "Reverse Political Coattails under a Technocratic Government: New Evidence on the National Electoral Benefits of Local Party Incumbency," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2121, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Toke Aidt & Zareh Asatryan & Lusine Badalyan & Friedrich Heinemann, 2020. "Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 409-425, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:4:p:480-509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.