IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v179y2024ics0305750x24000330.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does representation affect trust in political institutions?: Evidence from redistricting in India

Author

Listed:
  • Kukreja, Rolly

Abstract

Trust in political institutions is considered to be distinctly crucial for maintaining the stability and legitimacy of such institutions. In this paper, I document an important channel through which characteristics of political institutions could affect political trust by studying the impact of a change in representation on political trust. I use the delimitation exercise of 2008 as a source of change in representation of districts within state legislatures in India and respondents’ self-reported confidence in politicians and state government from two rounds of the IHDS (India Human Development Survey) as measures of political trust. Implementing a difference-in-differences strategy with a household panel, the estimates show that households living in districts that gained representatives in the state legislative assembly show an improvement in reported confidence in both politicians and the state government. There is no evidence of a symmetric negative effect for households living in districts that lose seats. Further, this improvement in confidence is accompanied by an improvement in economic performance as proxied by night time luminosity and is associated with an increase in voter turnout as well as a decrease in age and corruption of electoral candidates in gaining districts.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukreja, Rolly, 2024. "Does representation affect trust in political institutions?: Evidence from redistricting in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:179:y:2024:i:c:s0305750x24000330
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106563
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X24000330
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106563?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anderson, Michael L., 2008. "Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 103(484), pages 1481-1495.
    2. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471.
    3. Brian Knight, 2008. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1785-1803, October.
    4. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2010. "Inherited Trust and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2060-2092, December.
    5. Citrin, Jack, 1974. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 973-988, September.
    6. Mitsch, Frieder & Lee, Neil & Ralph-Morrow, Elizabeth, 2021. "Faith no more? The divergence of political trust between urban and rural Europe," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110497, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    8. Levine, David K. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 143-158, February.
    9. Guido Tabellini, 2010. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 677-716, June.
    10. Simon Heß, 2017. "Randomization inference with Stata: A guide and software," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 17(3), pages 630-651, September.
    11. Thomas J. Rudolph & Jillian Evans, 2005. "Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government Spending," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(3), pages 660-671, July.
    12. Bargain, Olivier & Aminjonov, Ulugbek, 2020. "Trust and compliance to public health policies in times of COVID-19," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    13. Stephen Hansen & Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1987. "The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 15-33, January.
    14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/432sbils8u9t7qa99cii5psht1 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Banerjee, Abhijit & Somanathan, Rohini, 2007. "The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 287-314, March.
    16. Prakash, Nishith & Rockmore, Marc & Uppal, Yogesh, 2019. "Do criminally accused politicians affect economic outcomes? Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    17. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657.
    18. Imai, Masami, 2022. "Local economic impacts of legislative malapportionment," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    19. Hetherington, Marc J., 1999. "The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968–96," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(2), pages 311-326, June.
    20. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Gerber, Alan & Snyder, Jim, 2002. "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(4), pages 767-777, December.
    21. Qian, Nancy & Nunn, Nathan & Wen, Jaya, 2018. "Distrust and Political Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 12555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Yusaku Horiuchi & Jun Saito, 2003. "Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 669-682, October.
    23. Torgler, Benno, 2005. "Tax morale and direct democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 525-531, June.
    24. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    25. Kenny, Michael & Luca, Davide, 2021. "The urban-rural polarisation of political disenchantment: an investigation of social and political attitudes in 30 European countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112683, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    26. Sam Asher & Tobias Lunt & Ryu Matsuura & Paul Novosad, 2021. "Development Research at High Geographic Resolution: An Analysis of Night-Lights, Firms, and Poverty in India Using the SHRUG Open Data Platform," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 35(4), pages 845-871.
    27. Oliver, J. Eric, 2000. "City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 361-373, June.
    28. Vernon Henderson & Adam Storeygard & David N. Weil, 2011. "A Bright Idea for Measuring Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 194-199, May.
    29. Bhavnani, Rikhil R., 2018. "The Effects of Malapportionment on Cabinet Inclusion: Subnational Evidence from India," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 69-89, January.
    30. Sen, Kunal, 2013. "The Political Dynamics of Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 71-86.
    31. Michael Kenny & Davide Luca, 2021. "The urban-rural polarisation of political disenchantment: an investigation of social and political attitudes in 30 European countries," Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 14(3), pages 565-582.
    32. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Min, Brian & Uppal, Yogesh, 2015. "Election cycles and electricity provision: Evidence from a quasi-experiment with Indian special elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 64-73.
    33. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Strategic Redistricting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-1641, September.
    34. Rikhil R Bhavnani, 2021. "The effects of malapportionment on economic development," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(12), pages 1-12, December.
    35. Hetherington, Marc J., 1998. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 791-808, December.
    36. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2017. "Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 229-273, January.
    37. Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-629, June.
    38. Nathan Nunn & Nancy Qian & Jaya Wen, 2018. "Distrust and Political Turnover during Economic Crises," NBER Working Papers 24187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frank, Marco & Stadelmann, David, 2021. "More federal legislators lead to more resources for their constituencies: Evidence from exogenous differences in seat allocations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 230-243.
    2. Harjunen, Oskari & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Tukiainen, Janne, 2021. "Political representation and effects of municipal mergers," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 72-88, January.
    3. Makkar, Karan, 2023. "Defector Politicians and Economic Growth: Evidence from India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    4. Halse, Askill H., 2016. "More for everyone: The effect of local interests on spending on infrastructure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 41-56.
    5. Hyytinen, Ari & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Tukiainen, Janne, 2014. "Electoral vulnerability and size of local governments: Evidence from voting on municipal mergers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-204.
    6. Jain, Chandan & Kashyap, Shagun & Lahoti, Rahul & Sahoo, Soham, 2023. "The impact of educated leaders on economic development: Evidence from India," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 1068-1093.
    7. Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions [“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3154-3206.
    8. Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas & Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 39-56.
    9. Tiberiu Dragu & Jonathan Rodden, 2010. "Representation and regional redistribution in federations," Working Papers 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2013. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 257-282, November.
    11. Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63.
    12. Jie Zhang, 2021. "More political representation, more economic development? Evidence from Turkey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 275-299, June.
    13. Gautam Bose & Mitchell Choi & Hasin Yousaf, 2021. "Culture, Economic Shocks and Conflict: Does trust moderate the effect of price shocks on conflict?," Discussion Papers 2021-03, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    14. Oskari Harjunen & Tuukka Saarimaa & Janne Tukiainen, 2021. "Love Thy (Elected) Neighbor? Residential Segregation, Political Representation and Local Public Goods," Discussion Papers 138, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    15. Jennes, Geert & Persyn, Damiaan, 2015. "The effect of political representation on the geographic distribution of income: Evidence using Belgian data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 178-194.
    16. Valencia Caicedo, Felipe & Tur-Prats, Ana, 2020. "The Long Shadow of the Spanish Civil War," CEPR Discussion Papers 15091, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Jayasekara, Dinithi N. & Fredriksson, Per G., 2021. "Culture, intellectual property rights, and technology adoption," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 317-330.
    18. Ulubasoglu, Mehmet Ali & Yaraşır-Tülümce, Sevinç, 2019. "Pork and Turkey: Distributive Politics in the Allocation of Public Investments into Turkish Electoral Districts 1987–2004," MPRA Paper 96842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Kauder, Björn & Björn, Kauder & Niklas, Potrafke & Markus, Reischmann, 2016. "Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Maaser, Nicola & Stratmann, Thomas, 2016. "Distributional consequences of political representation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 187-211.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political trust; Representation; Political institutions; Redistricting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:179:y:2024:i:c:s0305750x24000330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.