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Standing in cost-benefit analysis of road safety measures: A case of speed enforcement vs. speed change

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  • Veisten, Knut
  • Stefan, Christian
  • Winkelbauer, Martin

Abstract

Elvik (2006) discussed the appropriateness of including the benefits that offenders get when violating traffic laws. While concluding that these benefits could not be given standing, Elvik resorted to argumentation from normative theories outside the schools of economic theory. In this article, we present arguments for omitting violators' benefits, or lost benefits, based on normative stands within economics school of thought. By means of two examples, we illustrate the distinction between a project of increased/improved enforcement of existing speed limits, where violators' time losses should not be included – compatible with Elvik's point of view – and a project of reduced speed limits, where the time loss should be included. This clarification of standing in cost-benefit analysis of road safety measures is based on the economics school of thought, where cost-benefit analysis is regarded as a decision tool operating within social constraints and where speed limits are considered as absolute institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Veisten, Knut & Stefan, Christian & Winkelbauer, Martin, 2013. "Standing in cost-benefit analysis of road safety measures: A case of speed enforcement vs. speed change," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 269-274.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:269-274
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2013.09.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Castillo-Manzano, José I. & Castro-Nuño, Mercedes & Fageda, Xavier, 2015. "Are traffic violators criminals? Searching for answers in the experiences of European countries," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 86-94.
    2. Borsati, Mattia & Cascarano, Michele & Bazzana, Flavio, 2019. "On the impact of average speed enforcement systems in reducing highway accidents: Evidence from the Italian Safety Tutor," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 20(C).
    3. Dong, Hongming & Zhong, Shiquan & Xu, Shuxian & Tian, Junfang & Feng, Zhongxiang, 2021. "The relationships between traffic enforcement, personal norms and aggressive driving behaviors among normal e-bike riders and food delivery e-bike riders," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 138-146.
    4. Castillo-Manzano, José I. & Castro-Nuño, Mercedes & López-Valpuesta, Lourdes & Pedregal, Diego J., 2019. "From legislation to compliance: The power of traffic law enforcement for the case study of Spain," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-9.
    5. Thiedig, Johannes, 2018. "An economic cost-benefit analysis of a general speed limit on German highways," Discussion Papers 2018/17, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.

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