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Research on evolutionary game and stability of port cooperation

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  • Yuan, Kebiao
  • Wang, Xuefeng

Abstract

Faced with the pressure brought by major changes in the shipping industry such as liner alliances and larger ships, more and more ports are inclined to choose cooperation. This paper first explains the reasons for the lack of spontaneous cooperation motives between ports through game theory and then points out that in order to achieve stable cooperation between ports, it may be necessary to use external forces to establish a cooperation mechanism that enables both parties to achieve a win-win situation. Further, the article explores the evolution path of port cooperation and the stability of cooperation through evolutionary game theory and finds that the incremental benefits of port cooperation, the cost of cooperation, the additional revenue of free-riding, the compensation for unilateral cooperation, and the distribution coefficient of incremental benefits are the key factors affecting the stability of port cooperation. Then, with the help of numerical simulation experiments, the influencing factors affecting the evolution path and stability of port cooperation are discussed. Finally, in order to promote port cooperation and improve the stability of cooperation, this paper puts forward corresponding policy implications and management insights for policymakers based on relevant influencing factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuan, Kebiao & Wang, Xuefeng, 2024. "Research on evolutionary game and stability of port cooperation," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 97-109.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:153:y:2024:i:c:p:97-109
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2024.05.015
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