Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9324-x
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More about this item
Keywords
Communication; Honesty; Guilt aversion; Lie aversion; Norms; C70; C91; D03; D64;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
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