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Frames and social games

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  • Lanzi, Diego

Abstract

In this paper, we model socially-embedded games. We use non-cooperative game forms with pure strategy Nash equilibria and embed them through framing structures. These frames alter how players perceive the game, or rule out the choice of some elements of players’ option sets. In this way, we explicitly link the notion of social game to concepts taken from Erving Goffman's theory of interaction. According to Goffman, game theory is flawed because it applies a single-level model to two-leveled situations, ignoring the fact that people form impressions and expectations during or before any strategic game. In this essay, we provide a set-up endowed with these two levels. Firstly, players endogenize a given setting and frame the interaction. This determines what kind of game they will play. Secondly, they select Nash equilibrium strategies. As we shall discuss, it is possible in this way to consider how frames operate and what role they have in determining Nash solutions of non-cooperative games.

Suggested Citation

  • Lanzi, Diego, 2013. "Frames and social games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 227-233.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:45:y:2013:i:c:p:227-233
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.08.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2010. "Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 170-191, September.
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    7. repec:bla:econom:v:59:y:1992:i:234:p:161-77 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Diego Lanzi, 2010. "Embedded choices," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 263-280, March.
    9. Binmore, Ken, 2007. "Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300574.
    10. Lanzi, Diego, 2011. "Frames as choice superstructures," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 115-123, April.
    11. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
    12. Tom Burns & Anna Gomolińska, 2000. "The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: The Mathematics of Social Relationships, Rule Complexes, and Action Modalities," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 379-406, November.
    13. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diego Lanzi, 2018. "On Embedded Choice Theory: Re-framing and Emotions," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 11, pages 19-30, February.
    2. Tom R. Burns & Ewa Roszkowska & Nora Machado Des Johansson & Ugo Corte, 2018. "Paradigm Shift in Game Theory: Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-40, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social games; Frames; Framing effects; Erving Goffman;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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