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Who's minding the kids? An economic comparison of sole and joint custody

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  • Welling, Linda
  • Bearance, Marci

Abstract

We examine the allocation of spending by divorced parents on both private goods and goods which they share with their child. Sole and joint custody arrangements differ in the pattern of shared goods. Parents play a non-cooperative game. We compute the putcomes under sole and joint custody, and examine the effects of income redistribution.
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  • Welling, Linda & Bearance, Marci, 2002. "Who's minding the kids? An economic comparison of sole and joint custody," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 15-29.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:15-29
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniela Del Boca & Rocio Ribero, 2003. "Visitations and Transfers After Divorce," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 187-204, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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