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Crowding-in of complementary contributions to public goods: Firm investment into open source software

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  • Reisinger, Markus
  • Ressner, Ludwig
  • Schmidtke, Richard
  • Thomes, Tim Paul

Abstract

We present a fairly general model in which firms are competitors in a commercial market segment and can invest into a complementary public good like open source software. We show that, contrary to standard predictions, additional contribution to the public good by the government or a new market entrant can lead to higher investments of all incumbent firms, that is, a crowding-in effect. This result occurs if the investment cost function is superadditive. We find that government contribution leads to larger crowding-in effects than subsidizing market entry if the price elasticity of demand with respect to the private good is large relative to the one with respect to the public good. Our results are robust to extensions in the timing and the mode of competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Reisinger, Markus & Ressner, Ludwig & Schmidtke, Richard & Thomes, Tim Paul, 2014. "Crowding-in of complementary contributions to public goods: Firm investment into open source software," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 78-94.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:106:y:2014:i:c:p:78-94
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.005
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    Cited by:

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    3. Menéndez-Caravaca, Eloísa & Bueno, Salvador & Gallego, M. Dolores, 2021. "Exploring the link between free and open source software and the collaborative economy: A Delphi-based scenario for the year 2025," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    4. David Worden & Getu Hailu & Kate Jones & Yu Na Lee, 2022. "The effects of bundling on livestock producers' valuations of environmentally friendly traits available through genomic selection," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 70(4), pages 263-286, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investment crowding-in; Government contribution; Market entry; Open source software;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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