IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/riibaf/v71y2024ics0275531924002344.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

National legislatures and corporate transparency

Author

Listed:
  • Carney, Richard W.
  • Chen, Ruiyuan
  • El Ghoul, Sadok
  • Guedhami, Omrane

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to posit and test whether the presence and structure of national legislatures can account for the varying degree of corporate transparency displayed by firms operating in emerging economies. We conducted tests using a sample of 226,088 firm-level observations spanning 67 countries over the period 1990–2014. Firms located in political regimes that lack national legislatures display a lower level of transparency than those in regimes with semi-competitive legislative elections, and these in turn display lower transparency than firms located in countries with competitive elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Carney, Richard W. & Chen, Ruiyuan & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane, 2024. "National legislatures and corporate transparency," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:71:y:2024:i:c:s0275531924002344
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102441
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531924002344
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102441?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutional theory; transparency; opacity; corporate earnings; emerging economies; authoritarian regimes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:71:y:2024:i:c:s0275531924002344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ribaf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.