IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/jintbs/v40y2009i9p1533-1562.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth

Author

Listed:
  • Art Durnev

    (Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Montreal, Canada)

  • Vihang Errunza

    (Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Montreal, Canada)

  • Alexander Molchanov

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand)

Abstract

In countries with secure property rights, corporate transparency improves investment efficiency and increases growth by alleviating information asymmetry. However, in countries with insecure property rights, greater transparency can increase the risk of government expropriation. Therefore some firms that would benefit most from transparency cannot take full advantage of it, as they set sub-optimal transparency levels. Using data from 59 industries in 69 countries, we find that in countries with weak property rights protection, industries that would benefit the most from transparency exhibit worse investment efficiency and grow more slowly than industries that can efficiently operate at minimal levels of transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Art Durnev & Vihang Errunza & Alexander Molchanov, 2009. "Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 40(9), pages 1533-1562, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jintbs:v:40:y:2009:i:9:p:1533-1562
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/journal/v40/n9/pdf/jibs200958a.pdf
    File Function: Link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/journal/v40/n9/full/jibs200958a.html
    File Function: Link to full text HTML
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Art Durnev & Sergei Guriev, 2007. "The Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel," Working Papers w0108, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Merton H. Miller & Daniel Orr, 1966. "A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 80(3), pages 413-435.
    3. Robert M. Bushman & Joseph D. Piotroski & Abbie J. Smith, 2004. "What Determines Corporate Transparency?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 207-252, May.
    4. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June.
    5. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    7. Mark H. Lang & Russell J. Lundholm, 2000. "Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 623-662, December.
    8. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan & Servaes, Henri, 2003. "International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 111-133, March.
    9. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-659, September.
    10. Shivakumar, Lakshmanan, 2000. "Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned equity offerings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 339-371, June.
    11. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    12. Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, 2003. "Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2401-2436, December.
    13. Desai, Mihir A. & Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2007. "Theft and taxes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 591-623, June.
    14. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 733-771.
    15. Russell Lundholm & Linda A. Myers, 2002. "Bringing the Future Forward: The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns‐Earnings Relation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 809-839, June.
    16. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    17. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    18. Guillermo Llorente & Roni Michaely & Gideon Saar & Jiang Wang, 2002. "Dynamic Volume-Return Relation of Individual Stocks," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 1005-1047.
    19. Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
    20. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    21. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Financial Dependence and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 559-586, June.
    22. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    23. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross‐Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
    24. Leuz, Christian & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 2006. "Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 411-439, August.
    25. Andrei A. Levchenko, 2007. "Institutional Quality and International Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 791-819.
    26. DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth, 1988. "Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance : The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 3-36, January.
    27. Trueman, Brett, 1986. "Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 53-71, March.
    28. Chaney, Paul K. & Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David, 2011. "The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 58-76.
    29. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:1:p:65-105 is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
    31. Bruno, Valentina & Claessens, Stijn, 2010. "Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 461-482, October.
    32. Qi Chen & Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, 2007. "Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 619-650.
    33. Holger Daske & Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz & Rodrigo Verdi, 2008. "Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(5), pages 1085-1142, December.
    34. Sreedhar T. Bharath & Paolo Pasquariello & Guojun Wu, 2009. "Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(8), pages 3211-3243, August.
    35. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 2000. "Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 479-519.
    36. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    37. Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, 2005. "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1461-1493, June.
    38. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    39. Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 145-179, January.
    40. Sonin, Konstantin & Goriaev, Alexei P., 2005. "Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair," CEPR Discussion Papers 5076, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    41. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    42. Raghuram Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, 2007. "Does Aid Affect Governance?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 322-327, May.
    43. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    44. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    45. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 387-392, May.
    46. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December.
    47. Artyom Durnev & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung & Paul Zarowin, 2003. "Does Greater Firm‐Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 797-836, December.
    48. George M. Constantinides, 1976. "Stochastic Cash Management with Fixed and Proportional Transaction Costs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(12), pages 1320-1331, August.
    49. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    50. René M. Stulz, 2007. "The Limits of Financial Globalization," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 19(1), pages 8-15, January.
    51. Alexeev, Michael & Janeba, Eckhard & Osborne, Stefan, 2004. "Taxation and evasion in the presence of extortion by organized crime," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 375-387, September.
    52. Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 509-540.
    53. Aggarwal, Reena & Erel, Isil & Stulz, Rene M. & Williamson, Rohan, 2006. "Do U.S. Firms Have the Best Corporate Governance? A Cross-Country Examination of the Relation between Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth," Working Paper Series 2006-25, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    54. Durnev, Art & Fauver, Larry, 2008. "Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance when States are Predatory," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-12, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    55. Core, John E., 2001. "A review of the empirical disclosure literature: discussion," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 441-456, September.
    56. Lang, M & Lundholm, R, 1993. "Cross-Sectional Determinants Of Analyst Ratings Of Corporate Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 246-271.
    57. Collins, Daniel W. & Kothari, S. P. & Shanken, Jay & Sloan, Richard G., 1994. "Lack of timeliness and noise as explanations for the low contemporaneuos return-earnings association," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 289-324, November.
    58. Kim, Chang-Soo & Mauer, David C. & Sherman, Ann E., 1998. "The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 335-359, September.
    59. Eppen, Gary D & Fama, Eugene F, 1969. "Cash Balance and Simple Dynamic Portfolio Problems with Proportional Costs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(2), pages 119-133, June.
    60. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June.
    61. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    62. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    63. Beck, Thorsten & Levine, Ross, 2002. "Industry growth and capital allocation:*1: does having a market- or bank-based system matter?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 147-180, May.
    64. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 2001. "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 405-440, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Art Durnev & Sergei Guriev, 2007. "The Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel," Working Papers w0108, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Lorenzo Caprio & Mara Faccio & John J. McConnell, 2013. "Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 332-354, April.
    3. Liu, Tingting & Liu, Yu & Ullah, Barkat & Wei, Zuobao & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2021. "The dark side of transparency in developing countries: The link between financial reporting practices and corruption," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Durnev, Art & Fauver, Larry, 2008. "Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance when States are Predatory," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-12, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5um2bhne3f862raaulvoogm15e is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5um2bhne3f862raaulvoogm15e is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    8. Andy Lardon & Marc Deloof, 2014. "Financial disclosure by SMEs listed on a semi-regulated market: evidence from the Euronext Free Market," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 361-385, February.
    9. Liu,Tingting & Ullah,Barkat & Wei,Zuobao & Xu,L. Colin, 2015. "The dark side of disclosure : evidence of government expropriation from worldwide firms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7254, The World Bank.
    10. Kuo, Nan-Ting & Lee, Cheng-Few, 2024. "Public governance and the demand for corporate governance: The role of political institutions," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PB).
    11. Nikolaev, V. & van Lent, L.A.G.M., 2005. "The Endogeneity Bias in the Relation Between Cost-of-Debt Capital and Corporate Disclosure Policy," Other publications TiSEM 5960a342-0adc-4f85-bf87-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Nikolaev, V. & van Lent, L.A.G.M., 2005. "The Endogeneity Bias in the Relation Between Cost-of-Debt Capital and Corporate Disclosure Policy," Discussion Paper 2005-67, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Nikolaev, V. & van Lent, L.A.G.M., 2005. "The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and corporate disclosure policy," Other publications TiSEM 04869b30-e8a9-4ecf-84ae-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Cai, Weixing & Hu, Feng & Xu, Fangming & Zheng, Liyi, 2022. "Anti-corruption campaign and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PA).
    15. Imhof, Michael J. & Seavey, Scott E., 2014. "Corporate risk-taking, firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 328-337.
    16. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 2001. "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 405-440, September.
    17. Etienne Farvaque & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Dhafer Saïdane, 2011. "Corporate disclosure: A review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 128, pages 5-31.
    18. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Clarkson, Peter & Gao, Ru & Herbohn, Kathleen, 2020. "The relationship between a firm’s information environment and its cash holding decision," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2).
    20. Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2013. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-33.
    21. Luo, Shuqing & Courtenay, Stephen M. & Hossain, Mahmud, 2006. "The effect of voluntary disclosure, ownership structure and proprietary cost on the return-future earnings relation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 501-521, November.
    22. Maurizio Rocca & Raffaele Staglianò & Tiziana Rocca & Alfio Cariola & Ekaterina Skatova, 2019. "Cash holdings and SME performance in Europe: the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic moderators," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1051-1078, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:jintbs:v:40:y:2009:i:9:p:1533-1562. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.