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Relations between the professional backgrounds of independent directors in state-owned enterprises and corporate performance

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  • Wang, Yong
  • Jin, Pengjian
  • Yang, Chongsheng

Abstract

The article analyzes how the professional backgrounds of independent directors (hereinafter IDs) in state-owned enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) influence corporate performance by collecting and analyzing publicly available data on listed companies. After differentiating between the “nominal professional backgrounds” and “real professional backgrounds” of IDs, we find that more than 85% of IDs have backgrounds in “the party-state system”. Based on IDs' “real professional backgrounds”, IDs' proportion of board seats is negatively correlated with corporate performance, indicating that IDs from “the party-state system” background did not play a positive and effective role in helping companies improve their corporate performance. Additional deep, broad analysis shows that the diversification of IDs' backgrounds in SOEs is positively correlated with corporate performance. Additionally, an SOE that has dissenting IDs or IDs with “different voices” achieves better corporate performance. Therefore, reducing the number of IDs from “the party-state system” and focusing more on IDs' professionalism and background diversity should be considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Yong & Jin, Pengjian & Yang, Chongsheng, 2016. "Relations between the professional backgrounds of independent directors in state-owned enterprises and corporate performance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 404-411.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:42:y:2016:i:c:p:404-411
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2015.10.011
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ni, Yensen & Huang, Paoyu & Chen, Yuhsin, 2019. "Board structure, considerable capital, and stock price overreaction informativeness in terms of technical indicators," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 514-528.
    3. Cheng Guping & Muhammad Safdar Sial & Peng Wan & Alina Badulescu & Daniel Badulescu & Talles Vianna Brugni, 2020. "Do Board Gender Diversity and Non-Executive Directors Affect CSR Reporting? Insight from Agency Theory Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-25, October.
    4. Tyrone T. Lin & Tsai-Ling Liu, 2021. "An Optimal Compensation Agency Model for Sustainability under the Risk Aversion Utility Perspective," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-16, March.
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    6. Zhang, Tianyu, 2023. "Peer effects in R&D investment based on interlock network: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    7. Su, Kun & Yang, Ruohan & Cui, Qian & Wang, Tianfu, 2024. "The geographic distance of independent directors and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
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    9. Lei Yu & Daojuan Wang & Qi Wang, 2018. "The Effect of Independent Director Reputation Incentives on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-15, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State-owned enterprises (SOEs); Independent directors (IDs); Corporate performance; Corporate governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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