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Examination workloads, grant decision bias and examination quality of patent office

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  • Kim, Yee Kyoung
  • Oh, Jun Byoung

Abstract

This paper investigates how increased examination workloads at patent office affect the patent examination process and tests whether workloads have any external effect on examiners’ decisions. Using novel micro-level data, we provide the first empirical evidence that examiner decisions are systematically biased as workload increases, with examiners being more likely to grant a patent than to reject it. The regression results also indicate that the quality of examinations decreases as workload increases. In appeal trials, the likelihood of grant decision reversal significantly increases as workload increases, while the likelihood of the revocation of a refusal decision exhibits statistically significant negative relationship with increased workloads. These results imply that an examiner who lacks sufficient time for a prior art search tends to grant a patent and, consequently, a large workload decreases the quality of examinations by resulting in unqualified patents.

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  • Kim, Yee Kyoung & Oh, Jun Byoung, 2017. "Examination workloads, grant decision bias and examination quality of patent office," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 1005-1019.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:46:y:2017:i:5:p:1005-1019
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2017.03.007
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    2. Benjamin Barber & Luis Diestre, 2022. "Can firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner‐shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(9), pages 1854-1871, September.
    3. Petit, Elise & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno & Gimeno-Fabra, Lluis, 2023. "Are patent offices substitutes?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(8).
    4. Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2019. "Subjective performance of patent examiners, implicit contracts, and self‐funded patent offices," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(3), pages 251-266, April.
    5. Gaétan De Rassenfosse & Paul H. Jensen & T'Mir Julius & Alfons Palangkaraya & Elizabeth Webster, 2023. "Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 124-142, March.
    6. Stephanie Cheng & Pengkai Lin & Yinliang Tan & Yuchen Zhang, 2023. "“High” innovators? Marijuana legalization and regional innovation," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(3), pages 685-703, March.
    7. Junbyoung Oh & Zhen Sun & Kineung Choo, 2023. "Financial Market Reactions to Patent Litigation: An Event Study of Litigation in Korea," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 39, pages 175-203.
    8. Rathi, Sawan & Majumdar, Adrija & Chatterjee, Chirantan, 2024. "Did the COVID-19 pandemic propel usage of AI in pharmaceutical innovation? New evidence from patenting data," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    9. Sajad Ashouri & Anne-Laure Mention & Kosmas X. Smyrnios, 2021. "Anticipation and analysis of industry convergence using patent-level indicators," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(7), pages 5727-5758, July.
    10. Billington, Stephen D. & Colvin, Christopher L. & Coyle, Christopher, 2025. "Financing innovation: The role of patent examination," QUCEH Working Paper Series 25-01, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    11. Okada, Yoshimi, 2020. "The Screening Function of International Search Authorities under the Patent Cooperation Treaty: Evidence from the Japanese Government’s Policy Change in 1999," IIR Working Paper 20-13, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    12. Zhu, Kejia & Malhotra, Shavin & Li, Yaohan, 2022. "Technological diversity of patent applications and decision pendency," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1).
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    14. Nagaoka, Sadao & Yamauchi, Isamu, 2022. "Information constraints and examination quality in patent offices: The effect of initiation lags," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    15. Li Yao & He Ni, 2023. "Prediction of patent grant and interpreting the key determinants: an application of interpretable machine learning approach," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 128(9), pages 4933-4969, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    K0; O30; O38; Examination workloads; Grant decision bias; Type II error; Quality of examinations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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