Information constraints and examination quality in patent offices: The effect of initiation lags
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102839
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Cited by:
- de Grazia, Charles A.W. & Giczy, Alexander V. & Pairolero, Nicholas A., 2024. "Procrastination or incomplete data? An analysis of USPTO examiner search activity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(7).
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More about this item
Keywords
Information constraint; Patent examination; Prior art; Type I error; Type II error;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
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