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Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery

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  • Deacon, Robert T.
  • Finnoff, David
  • Tschirhart, John

Abstract

A common strategy for limiting the total annual catch in a fishery is to restrict entry and season length. We examine the results of this strategy when entry limitation amounts to a limit on capital, but fishing firms can vary an unrestricted input, and thereby use the restricted input more intensively. Under these regulatory constraints, fishing firms will earn rents that depend on the elasticity of substitution between restricted and unrestricted inputs. Using simulations with data from the Alaskan pollock fishery, rents and season length are shown to depend on fish and variable input prices, sometimes in surprisingly non-monotonic ways.

Suggested Citation

  • Deacon, Robert T. & Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2011. "Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 366-380, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:33:y:2011:i:2:p:366-380
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew N. Reimer & Joshua K. Abbott & James E. Wilen, 2014. "Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 538-559.
    2. Yue Tan & Sunny L. Jardine, 2019. "Considering Economic Efficiency in Ecosystem-Based Management: The Case of Horseshoe Crabs in Delaware Bay," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(2), pages 511-538, February.
    3. Ronan Congar & Louis Hotte, 2021. "Open Access Versus Restricted Access in a General Equilibrium with Mobile Capital," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(3), pages 521-544, March.
    4. Eli P. Fenichel & Joshua K. Abbott, 2014. "Natural Capital: From Metaphor to Measurement," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27.
    5. Squires, Dale, 2016. "Firm behavior under quantity controls: The theory of virtual quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 70-86.
    6. Reimer, Matthew N. & Rogers, Anthony & Sanchirico, James, 2024. "Adaptive Systems for Climate-Ready Fisheries Management," RFF Working Paper Series 24-06, Resources for the Future.
    7. Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.

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