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Instrument choice in a fishery

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  • Boyce, John R.

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  • Boyce, John R., 2004. "Instrument choice in a fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 183-206, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:47:y:2004:i:1:p:183-206
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    1. Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1987. "Suboptimal Controls in Common Resource Management: The Case of the Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 179-194, February.
    2. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-327, March.
    3. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Matulich, Scott C. & Mittelhammer, Ron C. & Reberte, Carlos, 1996. "Toward a More Complete Model of Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas: Implications of Incorporating the Processing Sector," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 112-128, July.
    7. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
    8. Criddle, Keith R. & Macinko, Seth, 2000. "A requiem for the IFQ in US fisheries?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 461-469, November.
    9. Jonathan M. Karpoff, 1989. "Characteristics of Limited Entry Fisheries and the Option Component of Entry Licenses," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(4), pages 386-393.
    10. Paul A. Samuelson, 1974. "Is the Rent-Collector Worthy of His Full Hire?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 7-10, January.
    11. Weitzman, Martin L., 1974. "Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 225-234, June.
    12. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
    13. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
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    Cited by:

    1. Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2008. "Linking dynamic economic and ecological general equilibrium models," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 91-114, May.
    2. Mallard, Graham, 2019. "Regulating whale watching: A common agency analysis," Annals of Tourism Research, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 191-199.
    3. David M. McEvoy & Sylvia Brandt & Sven Anders, 2009. "The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(3), pages 470-484.
    4. Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
    5. Christopher Hansman & Jonas Hjort & Gianmarco León, 2019. "Interlinked firms and the consequences of piecemeal regulation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 876-916.
    6. Martin F. Quaas & Max T. Stoeven & Bernd Klauer & Thomas Petersen & Johannes Schiller, 2018. "Windows of Opportunity for Sustainable Fisheries Management: The Case of Eastern Baltic Cod," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 323-341, June.
    7. MacGregor, James & Karousakis, Katia & Groom, Ben, 2004. "Using Economic Incentives to Conserve CITES-listed Species: A Scoping Study on ITQs for Sturgeon in the Caspian Sea," Discussion Papers 24139, International Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme.
    8. José-María Da-Rocha & Raul Prellezo & Jaume Sempere & Luis Taboada Antelo, 2017. "A dynamic economic equilibrium model for the economic assessment of the fishery stock-rebuilding policies," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2017-01, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    9. Smith, Martin D. & Zhang, Junjie & Coleman, Felicia C., 2008. "Econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories: Avoiding biological management failures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 265-280, May.
    10. Deacon, Robert T. & Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2011. "Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 366-380, May.
    11. Christopher Hansman & Jonas Hjort & Gianmarco León, 2015. "Firm's response and unintended health consequences of industrial regulations," Economics Working Papers 1469, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    12. HIGASHIDA Keisaku & TAKARADA Yasuhiro, 2009. "Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) Systems and Input and Stock Controls," Discussion papers 09046, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    13. John Boyce, 2010. "Putting Foxes in Charge of the Hen-House: The Political Economy of Harvest Quota Regulations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 475-493, August.
    14. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    15. Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    16. Matthew N. Reimer & Joshua K. Abbott & James E. Wilen, 2014. "Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 538-559.
    17. Andries Richter & Anne Maria Eikeset & Daan Soest & Florian Klaus Diekert & Nils Chr. Stenseth, 2018. "Optimal Management Under Institutional Constraints: Determining a Total Allowable Catch for Different Fleet Segments in the Northeast Arctic Cod Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(4), pages 811-835, April.

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