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Market Rent Dissipation In Regulated Open Access Fisheries

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  • Homans, Frances R.
  • Wilen, James E.

Abstract

Using a new model of markets in regulated open access resources, we illustrate the evolution of a fishery as demand for the product grows. We show that increased demand for fish in its fresh form shortens the fishing season and leads to the development of a market for processed fish. The model allows us to calculate the rent gains from rationalizing the fishery, and we show that much of the rent gains come on the market side as the season lengthens and more fish can be delivered to the higher-valued fresh market.

Suggested Citation

  • Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 2000. "Market Rent Dissipation In Regulated Open Access Fisheries," 2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL 21878, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea00:21878
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21878
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weninger, Quinn, 1999. "Equilibrium Prices in a Vertically Coordinated Fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 290-305, May.
    2. Homans, Frances, 1993. "Modeling regulated open access resource use," Faculty and Alumni Dissertations 313184, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
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    4. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
    5. James Eales & Catherine Durham & Cathy R. Wessells, 1997. "Generalized Models of Japanese Demand for Fish," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1153-1163.
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    8. Hardle, Wolfgang & Kirman, Alan, 1995. "Nonclassical demand : A model-free examination of price-quantity relations in the Marseille fish market," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 227-257, May.
    9. Sherry L. Larkin & Gilbert Sylvia, 1999. "Intrinsic Fish Characteristics and Intraseason Production Efficiency: A Management-Level Bioeconomic Analysis of a Commercial Fishery," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(1), pages 29-43.
    10. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    11. Salvanes, K. & DeVoretz, D., 1993. "Household Demand for Fish and Meat Products: Separability and Demographic Effects," Discussion Papers dp93-05, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaudet, Gerard & Moreaux, Michel & Salant, Stephen W., 2002. "Private Storage of Common Property," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 280-302, March.
    2. Trond Bjørndal & Daniel Gordon & Mintewab Bezabih, 2012. "Measuring potential profits in a bioeconomic model of the mixed demersal fishery in the North Sea," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 147-166, July.

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