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The quadratic oil extraction oligopoly

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  • Hartwick, John M.
  • Brolley, Michael

Abstract

Each extractor has a distinct initial endowment of oil and a distinct quadratic extraction cost and faces a linear industry demand schedule. We observe in a discrete-time model with a finite number of periods that the open loop and closed loop solutions are the same if initial stocks are such that each competitor is extracting in every period in which her competitors are extracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartwick, John M. & Brolley, Michael, 2008. "The quadratic oil extraction oligopoly," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 568-577, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:568-577
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mukesh Eswaran & Tracy Lewis, 1985. "Exhaustible Resources and Alternative Equilibrium Concepts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 459-473, August.
    2. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2006. "The Curse Of Windfall Gains In A Non Renewable Resource Oligopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 99-105, June.
    3. Lozada, Gabriel A., 1993. "Existence and characterization of discrete-time equilibria in extractive industries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 249-254, September.
    4. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    2. Wan, Rui & Boyce, John R., 2014. "Non-renewable resource Stackelberg games," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 102-121.
    3. Ray Chaudhuri, A. & Benchekroun, H. & Breton, Michele, 2018. "Mergers in Nonrenewable Resource Oligopolies and Environmental Policies," Other publications TiSEM 0900f396-d440-4db5-9102-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Benchekroun, Hassan & Breton, Michèle & Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray, 2019. "Mergers in nonrenewable resource oligopolies and environmental policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 35-52.
    5. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    6. Morin-Chasse, Remi & Herrmann, Markus, 2014. "On the Multiplicity of Equilibrium Strategies in a Non-Renewable Natural Resource Duopoly," Working Papers 181203, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
    7. Morin Chassé, Rémi & Herrmann, Markus, 2016. "On the multiplicity of open-loop equilibrium strategies in a non-renewable natural resource duopoly," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 101-113.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly extractors Closed loop solution;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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