Federalism, guns, and jurisdictional gun policies

The paper studies the effects of federalism on gun ownership and efficiency of jurisdictional gun policies. Jurisdictions in a federal system choose gun policies to suit their preferences, and gun policies differ across jurisdictions. The cost of owning a gun depends on the extent of gun regulations, and the differences in gun policies between jurisdictions in a federal system entail cross-jurisdiction gun buying. By contrast, in a unitary system, gun regulations are uniform across jurisdictions, and cross-jurisdiction gun buying is absent. As cross-jurisdiction gun buying enables residents of a jurisdiction to buy guns from other jurisdictions with less stringent regulations, federalism tends to increase gun ownership relative to a unitary system. In addition, more stringent regulations of a jurisdiction decrease the number of illegal guns that criminals of other jurisdictions can purchase, reducing crimes in other jurisdictions and benefiting other jurisdictions. However, the jurisdiction does not consider the external benefits on other jurisdictions when setting its gun policies, and gun policies tend be too lax relative to the efficient level. The paper also provides an empirical analysis of the effect of federalism on gun ownership, and available evidence suggests that gun ownership depends on federalism.