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A game-theoretic approach to modeling attacks and defenses of smart grids at three levels

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  • Shan, Xiaojun Gene
  • Zhuang, Jun

Abstract

As optimization, user capabilities, and data-taking abilities are incorporated into next-generation power grids, or smart grids, they face cyber threats. The traditional electrical grid could only be damaged by physical attacks; however, the smart grid can suffer remote/cyber attacks, which have not been studied extensively in the literature. The electrical grid forms the backbone of the modern society and its security has significant implications in military settings. This paper applies game theory to model three-levels (power plants, transmission, and distribution networks) of defenses and attacks in smart grid network security. We characterize both the attacker and the defender (who interact at three network levels: distribution, transmission, and power plants) best responses and equilibrium strategies. We find that the defender’s best response is not only a function of direct attacks but also of the spread from connected networks. Sensitivity analyses of the equilibrium strategies show that when success probability of an attack against power plants reaches a threshold, the defender increases defending efforts for power plants. In contrast, the attack effort at all levels is not affected by this probability. This paper provides some novel insights to modeling and analyzing the emerging threats to the growing smart grid networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Shan, Xiaojun Gene & Zhuang, Jun, 2020. "A game-theoretic approach to modeling attacks and defenses of smart grids at three levels," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:195:y:2020:i:c:s0951832019304077
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2019.106683
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jun Zhuang & Vicki Bier, 2011. "Secrecy And Deception At Equilibrium, With Applications To Anti-Terrorism Resource Allocation," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 43-61.
    2. Bier, Vicki M. & Gratz, Eli R. & Haphuriwat, Naraphorn J. & Magua, Wairimu & Wierzbicki, Kevin R., 2007. "Methodology for identifying near-optimal interdiction strategies for a power transmission system," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 92(9), pages 1155-1161.
    3. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell & Dai, Yuanshun, 2014. "Optimal defense with variable number of overarching and individual protections," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 81-90.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Oster, Matthew R. & King, Ethan & Bakker, Craig & Bhattacharya, Arnab & Chatterjee, Samrat & Pan, Feng, 2023. "Multi-level optimization with the koopman operator for data-driven, domain-aware, and dynamic system security," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
    3. Ding, Zhetong & Chen, Chunyu & Cui, Mingjian & Bi, Wenjun & Chen, Yang & Li, Fangxing, 2021. "Dynamic game-based defensive primary frequency control system considering intelligent attackers," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    4. Hausken, Kjell, 2024. "Fifty Years of Operations Research in Defense," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 318(2), pages 355-368.
    5. Fu, Xiuwen & Li, Qing & Li, Wenfeng, 2023. "Modeling and analysis of industrial IoT reliability to cascade failures: An information-service coupling perspective," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    6. Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
    7. Berghout, Tarek & Benbouzid, Mohamed & Muyeen, S.M., 2022. "Machine learning for cybersecurity in smart grids: A comprehensive review-based study on methods, solutions, and prospects," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 38(C).
    8. Wu, Yipeng & Chen, Zhilong & Dang, Junhu & Chen, Yicun & Zhao, Xudong & Zha, Lvying, 2022. "Allocation of defensive and restorative resources in electric power system against consecutive multi-target attacks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    9. Zhang, Jing & Wang, Yan & Zhuang, Jun, 2021. "Modeling multi-target defender-attacker games with quantal response attack strategies," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    10. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ding, Song & Ge, Bingfeng & Xia, Boyuan & Pedrycz, Witold, 2021. "Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    11. Lin, Chen & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui & Xiang, Yisha, 2021. "Optimal defense-attack strategies between M defenders and N attackers: A method based on cumulative prospect theory," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

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