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Retake opportunities, pass probabilities and preparation for exams

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  • Bertola, Giuseppe

Abstract

Additional retake opportunities generally increase the probability of eventually passing a given threshold at given competence, and decrease preparation for exams. Preparation work performed before the first attempt may increase only for very weak students, and may decline so much as to decrease the total pass probability only for very strong students. If additional preparation is possible before retaking a failed exam, it is optimal for students to make early attempts without much preparation. Some will be lucky enough to pass, and others will make many attempts after gradually improving preparation. Hence, plentiful retake opportunities reduce the reliability of exam results as an indicator of competence, and increase the cost of taking and administering exams for students and teachers.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertola, Giuseppe, 2024. "Retake opportunities, pass probabilities and preparation for exams," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 99-114.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:78:y:2024:i:1:p:99-114
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2024.01.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kala Krishna & Sergey Lychagin & Veronica Frisancho, 2018. "Retaking In High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 449-477, May.
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    4. Joshua J. Lewer & Colin Corbett & Tanya M. Marcum & Jannett Highfill, 2021. "Modeling Student Effort: Flat Tires and Dead Batteries," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 66(2), pages 301-314, October.
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    7. Giuseppe Bertola, 2023. "University dropout problems and solutions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 221-248, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bratti, Massimiliano & Granato, Silvia & Havari, Enkelejda, 2024. "Another Chance: Number of Exam Retakes and University Students' Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 17400, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sequential options; Information content of test results; Graduate wage premia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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