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Strategic dissent in the Hotelling–Downs model with sequential entry and private information

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  • Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
  • Bhalla, Manaswini
  • Chatterjee, Kalyan
  • Roy, Jaideep

Abstract

We analyze the Hotelling–Downs model of winner-take-all elections with sequential entry where n≥2 ‘office-seeking’ candidates with privately known qualities choose entry decisions and commit to policy platforms on entering. Voters receive informative public signals about the quality of each contestant once all platforms are announced. We characterize two-party equilibria when the order of entry is exogenously given. In these equilibria, entry can occur in any ‘round’ with positive probability: high-quality candidates signal their type through showing ideological dissent with the voters while low-quality ones randomize between (mis)-signaling quality through dissent and staying out. Interestingly, while informative public signals can keep low-quality candidates out of competition up to a certain degree, electoral competition improves the voter׳s information about candidate types beyond what the signals can reveal. However this endogenous mechanism of strategic information transmission leads to political polarization.

Suggested Citation

  • Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Bhalla, Manaswini & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Strategic dissent in the Hotelling–Downs model with sequential entry and private information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 51-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:1:p:51-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2016.11.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Jaideep Roy, 2015. "Manufacturing extremism: political consequences of profit-seeking media," Discussion Papers 15-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Jaideep Roy, 2020. "Extremist Platforms: Political Consequences Of Profit‐Seeking Media," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1173-1193, August.
    3. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 273-287.

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