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Manufacturing extremism: political consequences of profit-seeking media

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Listed:
  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
  • Kalyan Chatterjee
  • Jaideep Roy

Abstract

We analyze the consequences of a monopolistic, non-partisan, profit maximizing media on policy divergence. The media undertakes costly coverage that may reveal the quality of an office-seeking political challenger only if quality-conscious voters pay for an access fee. Voters are ideologically homogenous and the incumbent politician is a populist with known quality. We show that while media absence implies a populist challenger, media presence yields platform extremism: it creates demand for informatin about quality and provides incentives to the media to invest in coverage that are exploited by high-quality challengers to signal strength.

Suggested Citation

  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Jaideep Roy, 2015. "Manufacturing extremism: political consequences of profit-seeking media," Discussion Papers 15-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:15-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Honryo, Takakazu, 2013. "Signaling Competence in Elections," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 442, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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    12. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Rozado & Eric Kaufmann, 2022. "The Increasing Frequency of Terms Denoting Political Extremism in U.S. and U.K. News Media," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-16, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unobserved quality; Political challenger; Demand for electoral news; Media;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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