Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.003
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Nicolas Roux & Joel Sobel, 2015.
"Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 202-232, November.
- Roux, Nicolas & Sobel, Joel, 2015. "Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt78t320tr, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Roux, Nicolas & Sobel, Joel, 2015. "Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt64g6x4t0, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1991.
"Oligopoly Limit Pricing,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 155-172, Summer.
- Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1989. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 829, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003.
"Hiding information in electoral competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
- Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
- ,, 2014. "On the relationship between individual and group decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
- Dan Bernhardt & Odilon Câmara & Francesco Squintani, 2011. "Competence and Ideology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(2), pages 487-522.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
- Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987.
"Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1986. "On the strategic stability of equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Bhalla, Manaswini & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Strategic dissent in the Hotelling–Downs model with sequential entry and private information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 51-66.
- Steven Callander, 2008. "Political Motivations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 671-697.
- Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 147-167, July.
- Joel Sobel, 2014. "On the relationship between individual and group decisions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000950, David K. Levine.
- Navin Kartik & R. Preston McAfee, 2007. "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 852-870, June.
- Kfir Eliaz & Debraj Ray & Ronny Razin, 2006. "Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1321-1332, September.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2021.
"Competition in Signaling,"
MPRA Paper
106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers 329582, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Federico Vaccari, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," Working Papers 2022.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021.
"Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
- Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print hal-03637788, HAL.
- Andreas Grunewald & Emanuel Hansen & Gert Pönitzsch, 2020. "Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 273-311, July.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Yasushi Asako, 2015.
"Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 613-649, October.
- Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?," Working Papers 1411, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2021.
"Competition in Signaling,"
MPRA Paper
106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Federico Vaccari, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," Working Papers 2022.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers 329582, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Foucart, Renaud & Schmidt, Robert C., 2019. "(Almost) efficient information transmission in elections," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 147-165.
- Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020. "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 307-328.
- Hisashi Sawaki, 2017. "Ideology signaling in electoral politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 48-68, January.
- Honryo, Takakazu, 2013. "Signaling Competence in Elections," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 442, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jason Matthew DeBacker, 2015.
"Flip‐Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs In The United States Senate,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 108-128, January.
- DeBacker, Jason, 2008. "Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate," MPRA Paper 8735, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jason M. DeBacker, 2014. "Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate," Working Papers 201403, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Barney Hartman‐Glaser & Benjamin Hébert, 2020.
"The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(1), pages 463-506, February.
- Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2017. "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers repec:ecl:stabus:3569, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2019. "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers 3569, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin M. Hébert, 2019. "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25450, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin Hebert, 2018. "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," 2018 Meeting Papers 160, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Yasushi Asako, 2015.
"Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 322-353, September.
- Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal," Working Papers 1409, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
- Robert C. Schmidt, 2015. "The political economy of climate policy," Working Papers 2015015, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
- Peter Vida & Takakazu Honryo & Helmuts Azacis, 2022. "Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games," THEMA Working Papers 2022-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- David Dillenberger & Colin Raymond, 2016. "Group-Shift and the Consensus Effect, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 Sep 2016.
- Thomas Jensen, 2013. "Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality," Discussion Papers 13-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021.
"Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
- Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print hal-03637788, HAL.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Private polling in elections and voter welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2021-2056, September.
- Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2022.
"Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(3), pages 443-477, July.
- Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2018. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," MPRA Paper 89215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dillenberger, David & Raymond, Collin, 2019. "On the consensus effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 384-416.
- Wane, Waly, 2000. "Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2394, The World Bank.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014.
"Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
- Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Post-Print hal-03392982, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Signaling game; Risky shifts;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:273-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.